Today, there is much talk of the end of the international order based on liberalism, and its replacement by a new system of relations that is still in the process of formation. It is not by chance that I have used the term ‘system of relations’ instead of ‘new order’, because how orderly the emerging system will be is still a question. Even before Donald Trump’s second presidency, I used the term ‘disorderly order’ because the war in Ukraine and the period leading up to it lacked the stability and predictability that characterizes real order. And after the oath of office taken by the US President on January 20, the ‘disorderly order’ has deepened even further. And this manifests itself, above all, in the fundamental undermining, if not the final destruction, of the foundations of the liberal rules-based international system.
Of particular note is the fact that such fluctuations will continue and are likely to take a form that cannot currently be accurately imagined. This process has many characteristics and many other manifestations. In this article, however, I will talk about only one – and by all accounts the most important – phenomenon of the Trump presidency. What we witnessed as a result of the oath of office on January 20, the radical transformation of the liberal international order, clearly indicates the crossing of the Rubicon and, consequently, the refusal to adhere consistently to the global rules of general consensus. The question here is also whether such a refusal is final or, at best, has a long-term effect. Beyond the talk, we see more concrete policies from individual countries or leaders, perhaps indicating the final chapter of the international order based on liberalism. This is sort of epilogue instead of prologue…
Briefly on the (not too distant) history
The rules-based order is not just a ‘trademark’ of modern times. Its analogues can be found in various periods of human history, be it the era of Ancient Rome, the operation of the Westphalian system of 1648, or the rules of behavior between countries resulting from the Congress of Vienna of 1815.
Against this highly incomplete list of historical parallels, the modern version of the rules-based order in the United States dates back to the presidency of Woodrow Wilson. The defeat of Germany in World War I, the collapse of the three empires (Russian, Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian) and the creation of the League of Nations marked the introduction to a rules-based international order. It also related to the initial outline of the ‘World of Free Nations,’ which later manifested itself after the end of the Second World War, and later, immediately after the end of the so-called ‘Cold War,’ formed as we know it.
It should be noted that all three of the above-mentioned milestone phenomena presupposed the functioning of the ‘free world’ in reality according to the Anglo-Saxon typology, which in essence was to be based on the recognition of a free market, representative and democratic government, the rule of law and human rights and freedoms. It is important to say, however, that these principles did not represent an unconditional limitation on the ‘free world’s’ relations with the rest of the world outside. Moreover, situational interaction or relatively systematic co-operation with non-democratic regimes, stemming from an ever-changing understanding of the ‘national interests’, was explained by the inevitable need to defeat a much greater ‘evil’.
Anyway, ‘Wilsonianism’ more or less survived the test of various historical storms – and in the context of its evolution, the EU is considered the most successful project – until the second decade of the 2000s. Here, several powerful factors stood in the way of its effectiveness and prospects, among which I would emphasize the following:
(1) Coordinated resistance from China-Russia-Iran & Co, which was and remains driven primarily by the inviolability of domestic political regimes;
(2) The disproportionate (and not just monetary) costs of US/Western involvement in conflicts or wars outside its geopolitical borders in one form or another;
(3) Technological innovation and the accompanying information warfare, which, along with its many benefits, has also created a major challenge. This problem is manifested in the use of information technology in a propaganda campaign that is anti-democratic and promotes authoritarianism, populism and radicalism. As a result, technological progress has led to a tenfold increase in domestic extremism as a side effect;
(4) The growing role of the Global South and middleweight countries (also known as regional ‘superpowers’) in international relations. This role is now, among other tasks, aimed at asserting their own state identity and greater autonomy.
At the origin of the formation of the ‘Trump Doctrine’?
It is probably too early to talk about Trump’s doctrinal approach. Neither the post-inauguration inertia of the election campaign, nor this short period since January 20, nor the asystemic, non-classical handwriting of Trump (as well as of some members of his administration), which is prone to an extremely ‘chaotic current’, will help to outline clear contours.
Yet the ‘vision’ offered a month after his assuming the presidency does provide a basis for certain observations. It also serves as something of a guide to this formation’s relationship with the White House.
Even during the election campaign, Trump honestly stated his desire to fundamentally change the existing ‘order’ in the world. This was his desire during his first presidency, too, although he was not given the opportunity to do so. Many reasons will be given for this, but the main one is the huge difference between the world then and the world now. In this respect, the ongoing war in Ukraine represents a clear watershed.
Trump 2.0, along with motivation, is now supposed to have proper knowledge and a plan of action. For this stage, the fundamental contours of the plan are as follows:
(1) Instead of Trump’s isolationist policy is global nationalism. In this case, the explanation of ‘nationalism’ should again be sought in the declared line of ‘America First,’ where the idea of national interest is super-dominant and super-determining. And as far as ‘globalism’ is concerned, we should expect a ‘nationalist’ expression of US national interests anywhere in the world, regardless of geographical distance or conjuncture.
(2) A more pragmatic understanding of the national interest will condition a stricter selectivity test for direct or indirect intervention in military conflicts. In other words, the United States does not commit its political, military, or financial resources a priori/unconditionally to any conflict simply because a rule of international law is violated there. The test mentioned above should serve precisely to clearly identify US national interests and the corresponding political and economic gains.
At the same time, it is equally noteworthy that the White House is no longer – at least for the moment – making statements about supporting democracy over autocracy, or even the importance of freedom and territorial integrity.
(3) Continuing the previous theses, another consideration has to do with the current administration’s rejection (presumably!) of ‘social engineering’ – that is, changing political regimes in various countries. Although in this case too, this approach is still subject to critical evaluation. For example, the open support for a certain political force in a certain country, especially during elections, by Trump’s cronies, or even their attitude towards the president of Ukraine indicates selectivity with regard to ‘social engineering’. The point is that support for political regime change can be explained not only by the undemocratic nature of the regime, but also by other so-called ‘apolitical’ considerations (including in relation to formal allies). Separate statements from January 20 this year also point to a peculiar, new understanding of ‘social engineering’.
(4) The growing role of the commercial component in foreign policy decisions, which can directly and overtly transform into commercial mercantilism. Last month provided more than enough material to illustrate this, whether it was the US tariff confrontation with the European Union or its neighbors, control of the Panama Canal, or the Ukraine mineral deal in exchange for ‘peace’.
Mutual benefit in international relations has been, is and will remain a constant feature of foreign policy.
However, today we are witnessing an attempt to move from delicate mutual benefit to open commercialization, when one or another support for an ally, partner or any other country actually becomes the equivalent of a ‘paid service’. I do not think it is necessary to clarify specifically what consequences such an approach – if it were to become globally widespread as a ‘pop culture’ – could have on the stability and predictability of the system of international relations.
With all of these principles firmly put into practice, the Trump administration will deliver a ‘guilty verdict’ on the liberal international system – if not indefinitely, at least for an extended period of time.
To be continued in next week’s GT.
Analysis by Victor Kipiani, Geocase Chairman
