In the everyday geopolitical vocabulary, Georgia is referred to as a “small country.” This is understandable, since according to established classifiers and existing indicators, it belongs precisely to the category of “small powers.” Here, I must make one essential caveat: in conversation, I refer to our country as a “compact country” rather than a “small country.” I consider this more appropriate.
The point is that despite the smallness of our territory, population, economic and military potential, or diplomatic weight, we are much more than “small,” by virtue of our historical past and cultural heritage. Therefore, as I already noted, wherever it is possible and “fitting,” I replace “small” with “compact”: by doing so, I try to boost our self-esteem as Georgians and raise the bar for our future.
A Terminological Premise
But let us set this substitution aside for now as “geopolitical belles-lettres” and use conventional terms for the rest of this discussion. In reality, the issue to be addressed in this short article is far more important than terminological digressions, as it concerns the country’s functioning, its evolution into a competitive and modern nation-state, and the future of Georgian state-political culture.
Therefore, I will frame the question as follows: Is it possible for Georgia to transcend the formal status quo of a “small country”? To what extent does it have the capacity, for its own self-sufficiency and modernization, to become a “small country with regional influence” that holds a functionally vital role for the wider Black Sea-Caspian region, practically operating with the status of a “middle power”?
To provide at least a “working” version of an answer to this question, I will outline a few observations.
On the Characteristics of a “Disorderly Order”
Today, we are witnessing a global realignment of the geopolitical point of balance: the world is shifting from the “American order” (Pax Americana) toward an “unknown order” or a “disorderly order.”
This transition period is characterized by a lack of the stability that typically defines both bipolar and unipolar international systems. In parallel, we see a rise in rivalry, transactionalism, and confrontation within a civilizational context, while the factor of the “law of force” [might makes right] is gaining significant weight.
Consequently, an imbalance of power is emerging within this highly complex process, and this new, so-called (dis)orderly order is characterized by:
1. The geopoliticization of the global economy and finance (e.g., the dollar zone vs. non-dollar zones);
2. Increased pressure on the democratic and international order;
3. Technological processes that are increasingly difficult to manage;
4. The growth of inequality and polarization;
5. The political instrumentalization of climate change;
6. Demographic imbalances and acute social challenges;
7. The intensification and hybrid nature of conflicts and warfare.
In such times and circumstances, a country with the status of a “middle power,” or even a “small country” that matches it in functionality, gains an additional advantage. Provided it is leveraged correctly, it receives an opportunity to become more proactive and, consequently, more widely recognized.
Exactly So…
When the right circumstances align, a “middle power” can significantly increase its influence over its immediate, and, in some cases, wider, neighborhood. This growth in influence manifests in specific ways, ranging from economic leverage to strategic geography, or even a combination of various factors.
By deploying these methods, the relations of “middle powers” (and middle-equivalent “small countries”) with major powers and other mid-tier states are marked in some instances by highly intensive cooperation, and in others, by open or covert obstruction.
As previously mentioned, the window of opportunity for a “middle power,” or a “small country” functionally approaching one, expands significantly in a multipolar world. This is driven by the high degree of uncertainty and instability inherent to a multipolar system. This trend becomes particularly pronounced in eras where brute force becomes an everyday reality. In other words, in times like our own.
I would add that given the dynamics of this emerging “disorderly order,” the effectiveness of how states influence one another is not static, but variable. Therefore, the status of a “middle power” is not a permanent category; a country’s transition from one tier to another is the result of many fluid variables.
It is no coincidence, then, that at specific stages and within highly specific contexts, the list of “middle powers” is quite diverse and eclectic: depending on the context, one might see Egypt and the Netherlands categorized alongside nations like India and Russia.
However…
To reiterate: possessing the status of a “middle power” does not guarantee the unconditional enjoyment of its benefits. This was much more difficult during the bipolar global order when the United States and the USSR confronted each other in the Cold War. It is similarly difficult today, in our time, to advance one’s own agenda at the intersection of the competing interests of the United States and the People’s Republic of China, especially when you may be directly pressured to choose a side.
The Georgian Case
Following this line of reasoning, I believe the ground has been prepared for us to focus specifically on Georgia. Let me remind you of the core question: despite formally holding the status of a “small country,” does it possess the ability to take on more than this status implies? Can it, in practice, become a de facto “middle power:” a “small country” with regional influence?
It is precisely the clear definition of its own functional purpose that will help Georgia achieve this objective, thereby allowing it to establish itself as a systemic, self-sufficient, and competitive nation-state.
We will discuss this in greater depth in Part 2.
Analysis by Victor Kipiani, Georgia First / Geocase
