Ukraine’s endurance is a strategic victory in itself, even if Kursk is lost, – says Dr. Joris van Bladel, a military strategist, senior fellow at the Egmont Institute, and author of the newly released book ‘The Land of Great Sacrifice: How Russia Defies Western Logic.’
Van Bladel dissects the latest developments in the Ukraine war in an interview with RFE/RL’s Georgian Service. He explores the fall of Kursk, the enduring flaws and strengths of Russia’s military mentality, and the unpredictable role of US President Donald Trump in shaping the next phase of the conflict — or, as Van Bladel warns, in potentially — and perhaps unintentionally — handing the Kremlin a new “Yalta.”
Let’s start with a brief overview of the front lines. What have we seen transpire in Kursk? Seven months the Ukrainians held it, and then lost it in 10 days. What happened?
The Kursk offensive once again demonstrated that the self-proclaimed second army in the world is barely capable of defending its own borders, paradoxically. In this case, it was largely because they were too focused on the Donbas front and unwilling to lift the pressure there, although eventually they still had to commit some forces from that theater. Nevertheless, we have to admit that the introduction of the North Koreans played a pivotal role: they were able to fill the gaps, and Russia started slowly but surely regaining the region.
Today, the Kursk offensive has more or less run its course. What effect that will have on the overall course of the war, we’ll see in the longer perspective.
This also leads us to the fundamental question: what was the strategic intent of this incursion? It was a very difficult endeavor to sustain, especially given Ukraine’s limited resources, especially its manpower shortages. The chief goal – to divert large numbers of Russian forces from Donbas to Kursk – clearly didn’t work out in the end, to an extent due to the arrival of the aforementioned North Koreans.
This takes us back to the realization that kinetic warfare is still very much here. Technology can replace many aspects of war, but here we saw that the superior numbers in manpower and firepower had their say. The conventional warfare element is still essential to this war.
By relinquishing Kursk, Ukraine loses what many thought would be a useful bargaining chip in the upcoming negotiations. If Zelensky had one card in hand, to use President Trump’s choice of wording, that was Kursk. And now it’s gone.
Yes. The Russians would never agree to start negotiations, be it ceasefire talks or something on a larger scale, with Kursk in Ukrainian hands. They had to get it back. That was always the strategy. They are grinding forward, very slowly, at huge costs, but they are making progress. And I don’t think it is going all according to the Russian military playbook: they would have preferred a sweeping offensive breakthrough, I’m sure, but that’s not the case here.
Russia is utterly confused by the incoherence, erratic approach of the United States. There is no plan, there is no policy, there is no strategy
What needs to be pointed out, and what is frankly amazing, is how the Ukrainian army, despite its many shortages, have held the line. This is a strategic victory in itself, that they have made Russians unable to achieve any strategic breakthrough over such a long period.
How long do you think they can keep doing it?
Impossible to say, obviously, but I don’t see their front line crumbling in any immediate future. But then we also have that disruptive element of Mr. Trump coming into all these dynamics. Nobody other than him, neither Ukrainians nor Russians, is actually willing to go into peace negotiations, or even ceasefire talks, based on the realities on the front. The ceasefire is being imposed by the Trump administration, under the narrative of making peace and to demonstrate that he has an impact on global affairs. It’s purely transactional. And we have seen already what Putin is doing: he is very vague in his responses. The only thing he is not vague about is that Russia won’t accept an imposed deal. They want to be the ones dictating terms, and Ukraine is not the main focus; it’s part of the larger Russian effort to reshape the existing architecture in world politics. They want to be considered as a major great power in the world, equal to the US and China.
Many have dubbed this as Yalta 2.0. Can they get it?
We know, objectively, that Russia is not a great power. Not even close. Their claim to being a great power rests on them possessing a pile of nuclear weapons. That’s the only aspect where they can assume that title with any authority. And with that in mind, it’s very strange to see how Washington seems to be willingly giving Russia a seat at the great powers’ table. I’m sure Putin and his regime would never have expected such large concessions and privileges, especially when they have made none in return.
The entire world is watching how a regime that has done what Russia did in Ukraine is rapidly reintroduced and given back its former status on the international scene. I fear Washington is greatly underestimating the skill and grit of the Kremlin diplomatic corps. I fear it’s not Donald Trump that is making a deal with the Kremlin—the Kremlin is playing Trump. Russia is using its well-honed negotiation tactics to manipulate him, extracting maximum advantage while disregarding any so-called agreements the moment they no longer serve its interests.
And to circle back to your initial question, this new Yalta- they will only get it if President Trump allows it to happen. Which leads us back to that disruptive, unpredictable element. It’s quite telling that if you look at the Russian reactions to the Riyad and Jeddah talks, they are utterly confused by the incoherence, the erratic approach of the United States. There is no plan, there is no policy, there is no strategy. It’s all very erratic.
One side effect of it all is that we’ve seen Europe mobilizing, taking defense and security more seriously. But I doubt whether that effect was intentional. Take, for example, President Trump’s claim that Ukrainian forces are encircled in Kursk: Trump’s claim is based on a Russian setup he impulsively picked up without verification. It reflects his habitual reliance on spontaneous, unverified assertions rather than a well-considered strategy. The Ukrainian denials underscore the disconnect between Trump’s rhetoric and battlefield realities.
Let’s turn to the Russian military mentality – a subject you explored in depth in your latest book – and its role these three years. what old truths have been reaffirmed and what new things have we learned?
We have once again seen that a lot of the elements in Russian military culture and mentality haven’t changed at all. A big chunk of its organizational culture has stayed the same. And if it is changing, it is doing so very, very slowly.
There is an aspect to the Russians that we may be underestimating in the West: the willingness to fight on, the sheer tolerance to pain and abuse
We can go back to the Second World War, the Chechen wars, and so on and see the same kind of behavior that we see now in Donbas. From 2009 onward, the Russian armed forces underwent a period of modernizing and reforming, but the mindset stayed the same. It is inefficient, it is toxic, that brutality we see time and time again.
What role has that played in the war – has it been a help to Russia?
It’s a bit of a paradox: on the one hand, we have seen that mentality being exposed in Ukraine, with all its inefficiencies. We’ve seen the initial debacle, we’ve seen the poorly organized assaults and so on. We’ve seen shortcomings in their logistical lines, their intelligence. On the other hand, we have seen that Russians are able to adapt, and there is an aspect that we may be underestimating in the West, and this is their willingness to fight on, the sheer tolerance to pain and abuse. From a purely military point of view, we’ve seen some unbelievable acts of, let’s call it “military bravery,” in the Russian military. We see VDV forces asking for their own positions to be hit. That’s tantamount to suicide, and it’s to protect their own mission.
They keep fighting where others would fold. Western forces would have perhaps given up if the losses were this staggering.
That we don’t know. We can never evaluate a military organization without combat. But based on how our Western societies have developed, the Western military culture, there is a huge difference between the two mentalities, each developing in the logic of their societies. And if there is ever a kinetic conflict, one thing I would counsel to never underestimate is the tenacity of the Russians.
Is that conflict on the cards? Former Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Gen. Zaluzhny, claims we are already in the midst of World War III. Do you agree?
No. I think it’s overstated. I understand why he would say that: it’s a matter of strategic communication, first and foremost. It also depends on what we define as war: if it’s hybrid warfare, then we, the West, NATO, Europe, are already at war with Russia, and we have no idea about it. We see hybrid war efforts carried out by Russia daily. So when I say we are at war, it’s not in a kinetic war, as we define it traditionally. We are at war, because there are many, many other means by which Russia is trying to damage us, but we aren’t in World War III yet.
Interview by Vazha Tavberidze
