I concluded my first essay with the following question: Does Georgia have the capacity, despite formally being a “small country,”to assume a role beyond this status? Can we, as a de facto “medium-sized country,” become a “small country” with regional influence?
The answer to this question lies in defining Georgia’s function as a nation. Without such functional utility and purpose, it will be difficult not only to enhance its geopolitical agency, but also to solidify its standing as a systemic, self-sufficient, and competitive nation-state. In our case, both tasks are tightly intertwined, and realizing either one in isolation is practically impossible.
More specifically…
Establishing Georgia as a geopolitical subject is equivalent to realizing its practical role as a so-called “indispensable nation” in the region. Broadly speaking, this role is nurtured by the country’s internal institutional and systemic framework, as well as by strengthening practically necessary international connections.
Forward-looking analysis, broad societal resilience, and geopolitical fortitude must become integral to the Georgian state-political process. Regardless of political or coalition affiliations, the hallmark of any Georgian government should be an adequate assessment of capabilities, recognition of the limits of those capabilities, proper identification of specific goals for a given stage, and the mobilization of necessary resources to achieve them.
When “correctly reading” external processes, Georgian diplomacy, and the political apparatus handling foreign relations, must possess complete and qualified knowledge of events unfolding in the immediate neighborhood to enable preventive responses.
Beyond the immediate neighborhood, a realistic policy based on capabilities, oriented toward practical (rather than declarative) results, must also feature a correct assessment of global processes. This includes the proper use of hedging in the context of bilateral or multilateral relations.
This highly specific art of conducting foreign policy was addressed both generally and specifically from the standpoint of hedging Georgian interests in the article I wrote on foreign policy.
The West: A Civilization, Not Merely a Vector
For Georgia, as a small country, the prospect of gaining and expanding regional influence depends on establishing itself as the Five-Cross Bastion of the West in the region.
The world cannot escape the phenomenon of global geopolitical spheres of influence: this is evident today and, in all likelihood, will remain a defining feature of the foreseeable future.
Therefore, the resilience, modernization, and competitiveness of the Georgian nation-state are directly tied to:
(a) The materialization of Western geopolitical influence in our region, as well as
(b) Our country’s role as a key entity in projecting strategic Western influence within the region.
Furthermore, I believe that in dialogues with both the West and our own citizens, the somewhat controversial term “spheres of influence” should be replaced with “civilizational sphere.” Not only does this sound more noble, but it is also geopolitically correct and emotionally balanced.
In light of the above, Georgia’s positioning in the region through the practical status of a “civilizational ally,” rather than merely a “strategic ally,” is far more meaningful and targeted toward tangible results in line with shared Western, Georgian, and regional interests.
Moreover, Georgia, as an autonomous subject of Western civilizational influence and a civilizational ally, should unconditionally and unreservedly enjoy all the benefits and advantages of Western civilization.
Among these benefits, first and foremost, is an economic system that operates smoothly not only under a “peacetime regime,” but also exhibits high resilience in a “crisis regime.” In this process, the Georgian side is by no means forbidden from being as opportunistic as contemporary Western policy offers: accordingly, Georgian opportunism envisions leveraging Western interests to secure maximum advantage for our own national interest.
Practical Forms for Regional Influence
To this end, any “inventory” must be preceded by one crucial caveat: we live in a world of asymmetries.
Consequently, the measure of skill in Georgian foreign and domestic policy lies in turning geopolitical, economic, or military imbalances that are unfavorable to us into instruments that work in our favor and serve our interests.
Figuratively speaking, the successful future of the Georgian state lies in creating a “pro-Georgian asymmetry,” which involves achieving maximum results with minimal resources. This can be accomplished through:
1. Increasing the capitalization of the country’s geolocation;
2. Facilitating trade and financial ties between East and West;
3. Establishing the country as a payment system hub;
4. Developing into a regional arbitration center for dispute resolution;
5. Positioning as a diplomatic and mediation platform for neighboring countries (for example, Tbilisi as a “Caucasian Vienna”).
Of course, the foundation and primary prerequisite for all these opportunities is a healthy domestic political reputation and the international authority that stems from it. Otherwise, achieving the tasks outlined in this article will remain nothing more than academic discussion…
Analysis by Victor Kipiani, Georgia First / Geocase
