Various comments and assessments regarding the so-called “multi-vectorism” in previous publications on the country’s foreign policy have prompted numerous questions. This makes it necessary to provide a few additional and essential clarifications.
For instance, we have repeatedly stated that the modern world can no longer be divided simply into “natural” democracies and non-democracies. It is equally evident that a narrowly defined, openly declared dominance of national interests shapes the foreign policy lines of many countries. Among other circumstances, this leads to a similarly declared expansion of their range of partners.
It is also noteworthy that alongside the egoistic nationalization of foreign policy, we have witnessed global and regional actors subjecting both domestic and foreign decisions to the so-called “security test.” In other words, processes are now filtered through the lens of national security, not just in the spheres of defense and security, but also in:
• Economic and investment sectors
• Infrastructure and logistics
• Cultural and educational fields, among others.
We can clearly conclude that along with the reimagining of state policy, we are witnessing the “securitization” of political thought: its militarization and security-focused shift, so to speak. This disconnects the decision-making process from ideological constraints and liberates it from various “-isms.”
Global Trends and the “Georgia First” Principle
Globally, this trend will persist into the foreseeable future. The gap between “black” and “white,” “acceptable” and “unacceptable,” and “moralism” and “necessity” will narrow even further. By this, I do not mean that the line between these categories will be completely erased. However, it is a fact that based on and driven by the principle of “the end justifies the means,” our country’s immediate and wider surroundings will become even more egoistic. For this, we in Georgia must begin preparing and adapting our mindset to this reality on a nationwide scale starting today.
It is no accident that the state policy of various nations is directly aimed at shifting from excessive dependence on others to a rational dependence
The title of our initiative, “Georgia First,” has naturally transitioned into our declared foreign policy line. Unlike the ruling party’s principle of “Only Georgia,” which equates to closing inward and shutting the country off from others, the “Georgia First” principle means openness to everyone, including partnership with partners, provided there is a maximum and principled defense of Georgia’s interests. Naturally, this applies wherever and to the extent that it is possible.
Therefore, infusing the country’s foreign policy with the substance of “Georgia First” is deemed an equally honest relationship with both our own citizens and the outside world. The consistent implementation of this principle also means consistency in building our own nation-state, as well as distinguishing between friend and foe, and maintaining a consistent attitude toward them.
Hedging: The High Art of Politics (Beginning)
The modern world has significantly altered our perception of “order,” as well as our understanding of international relations. In the current situation, and from a Georgian perspective, mastering the art of hedging acquires immense practical value.
The reality is that from the perspective of foreign policy management techniques, hedging (insuring) one’s interests with external actors pursues several highly specific objectives, namely:
1. Avoiding exclusive dependence on an unreliable country or countries;
2. Conducting relations with countries that have diverse political regimes or governance systems, while simultaneously promoting one’s own national choices within these relationships to varying degrees;
3. Maintaining the country’s acceptability to small, medium, or large nations in trade, technology, energy, and other sectors, which in turn serves national security.
The way things are heading, hedging is not so much a conscious choice you make, but rather a consequence of the international system’s “systemlessness”—a new order defined by “lack of order” and, as a result, instability and unpredictability. It appears, at first glance, to be an action counter to globalization, though this is merely a surface-level impression.
In reality, in international relations, especially in the medium and long term, hedging is the rejection of the previously held panacea of globalization and a movement toward a new, rational globalization. Therefore, rather than speaking of “de-globalization,” it would be far more accurate to talk about “re-globalization.”
One of the main effects of re-globalization, among others, must be:
• At a minimum: Reducing dangerous and manipulative dependence on unreliable countries and vulnerable nodes in the supply chain;
• At a maximum: Neutralizing this dependence entirely.
It is no accident that the state policy of various nations is directly aimed at shifting from excessive dependence on others to a rational dependence. This changes the previous picture of global interconnectedness, which was once viewed through “rose-colored glasses.”
This rationalization, or diversification, if you will, manifests across several key areas, particularly in the economy. More specifically, these are:
1. Trade with major global poles: Equally and without selectivity.
2. Greater economic security: Which, in extreme cases in some places, may even morph into economic autarky.
3. Localization of technologies: Meaning their local creation, implementation, and development.
4. Food self-sufficiency.
5. Implementation of diverse payment/tax systems.
6. National industrial policy.
7. Subsidizing local production: To ensure its competitiveness in foreign markets.
8. Creation of strategic reserves.
Hedging : The High Art of Politics (Continuation)
An organic prerequisite for economic hedging is hedging for security purposes. The present day creates an even more “creatively fertile” ground for this. It is enough to mention how relations are unfolding between Trump’s USA and NATO, the realignments in the Persian Gulf (for instance, the partnerships emerging between Israel and the UAE, or between Ukraine and several Persian Gulf nations), or even the fresh reassessment of the importance of regional blocks and alliances within the broader security system.
The high art of hedging demands an intellectually resourceful diplomacy
When discussing security, hedging in energy policy follows naturally. Without looking too far, right before our eyes, the Strait of Hormuz crisis serves as a catalyst for shifting toward renewable energy sources, as well as for Europe’s pursuit of new suppliers of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG).
The high art of hedging also drives the establishment of new standards in diplomacy, and, consequently, demands an intellectually resourceful diplomacy. Along with a multitude of choices, medium and especially small/compact countries find themselves facing the dilemma of making a rational choice to achieve optimal results amid this abundance. Crucially, in the modern world, this choice is no longer limited to global geopolitical poles; the role of regional poles must also be taken into account.
However, it is worth noting that a significant dilemma is also faced by the two main sponsors of this new “systemless” system of international relations: the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China. Alongside material resources, global sponsors face an equal demand for a commitment to stability and predictability, as well as consistency in their foreign policy lines. The current picture, however, leaves us with a sense of acute deficit in this regard.
Here is the English translation of the text, continuing with the clean, structured, and highly scannable formatting style:
Hedging for Us: Is it Permissible or Possible?
The answer regarding the permissibility of hedging for Georgia is unequivocal and clear: hedging is not only permissible, it is absolutely necessary.
It is practically essential due to: The “orderless order” and overlapping/converging system-shaping political styles discussed in the first text; the significant weakening of international law and institutions, the fragmentation of interests across global and regional formats, and the proliferation and influence of quasi-state and non-state actors; this new world of egoistic, often veiled bargaining and overt mercantilism: a world where “my” interest supersedes “our” interest, and bargaining for “my” benefit frequently comes at “our” expense; one critical condition: Remaining an organic part of Western civilization and establishing Georgia as a full-fledged member of the political West, and; the need to build Georgia not simply as a homeland, country, or state, but as a viable and competitive nation-state.
What Makes it Possible?
As for the possibility, this becomes achievable if every citizen of Georgia, through civic rather than ethnic nationalism, infuses the word “Georgian” with political rather than ethnic meaning. As a result, every Georgian becomes a factual, rather than just a legal, citizen and stakeholder of the country. Further, if, politically, Georgians will not settle for just a homeland, but will demand Georgia’s transformation into a state and work practically toward that goal. In addition, it will be achievable if the Georgian state establishes itself as a self-respecting, resilient, competitive, modernized, and systemic nation-state.
Only Georgia as a nation-state will be capable of declaring and continuously managing the two paramount tasks of navigating complex external webs: Maximizing National Security and Maximizing Economic Prosperity
The Agenda for Georgian Foreign Hedging
With the aforementioned conditions in mind, hedging in our foreign policy is achievable by first (a) correctly analyzing conflicting or diverse interests, and subsequently (b) finding windows of opportunity for Georgian interests based on that analysis to advance Georgia’s own agenda.
During this analysis, the following contemporary trends must be taken into account:
(1) The critical role of economic security within the overall national security system, and the growing participation of the state in this process.
(2) The “securitization” of other functional areas alongside the economy, subjecting relevant processes and decisions to a strict security test.
(3) The application of the principle of “compartmentalization” in foreign relations. In other words: (a) Cooperating on issues where cooperation is possible; (b) Making decisions when the solution has matured; (c) Engaging in dialogue where and when dialogue makes sense; (d) Postponing issues for future resolution if discussing or settling them is currently impossible.
(4) Minimal ideology in geopolitics and maximum focus on results-oriented actions. In modern terms, this approach is called “transactionalism.”
(5) Bold, unapologetic conversations about our own national interests during foreign contacts, which must be strictly grounded in competence and information.
(6) Maintaining a clear, realistic understanding of the feasibility and available resources when defining any agenda objective.
Conclusion
If we define the specific, realistic, and pressing near-to-medium-term agenda of the Georgian foreign policy line, including through the use of hedging techniques, it encompasses:
1. Securing the policy of non-recognition of Georgia’s Russian-occupied territories.
2. Contributing to the establishment of Georgia as a nation-state, which, among other things, means highlighting the country’s functional utility and increasing its practical participation in regional and trans-regional geo-configurations.
3. “Measuring in numbers” the performance of Georgian diplomacy, expressed through targeted involvement in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) into the country.
By Victor Kipiani, Geocase/Georgia First
