In this interview with Radio Free Europe/RL’s Georgian Service, Zineb Riboua, research fellow at the Hudson Institute, offers a fresh perspective on the Iran conflict and its ripple effects across the Middle East. She talks about how China, the United States, Russia, and regional players are navigating the crisis, and what it reveals about shifting alliances, influence, and power.
How is this war reshaping Beijing’s role in the Middle East, its interests, its limits, and how it is perceived across the region?
By attacking Iran, the US is also indirectly weakening China’s posture in the Middle East. China has a very good relationship with Gulf countries, with trade ties that are mostly transactional, often driven by oil. But for China, it’s beyond just the Belt and Road Initiative and the Digital Silk Road. Why? Because Iran is a very aggressive partner. They terrorize the region and control militias, which are very useful when contesting US power in a strategically vital area with major energy flows. For example, the Houthis in the Red Sea, blockading shipping and attacking commercial vessels, actually challenged US security architecture to the point that the United States could not fully respond and had to negotiate deals. That’s very good when you’re China. You want Gulf countries to see that the United States is struggling. You want that to happen because it’s the only way you can gain a better posture, especially with a Saudi Arabia that needs to have a channel to discuss with Iran and the Houthis. China offered that channel, which is why they brokered the Saudi-Iran normalization deal in Beijing.
Iran also plays a major role in sanctions evasion. China does not want to be a victim of US sanctions or end up in the same position as Putin. Using Iran to bypass sanctions and financial restrictions is crucial for China, especially considering a potential Taiwan crisis.
And Iran’s geography is strategically valuable, as shown in the 25-year cooperation agreement with $400 billion pledged by China. Every move China makes there reverberates beyond the Middle East into Central Asia and beyond. On many levels, it’s very noticeable how China also benefited from a very aggressive Iran, to the point where Iran’s own military arsenal was basically built by China: the missiles, the components, the chemicals, a lot of it came from China. Also, there’s the surveillance part, and Iran’s own regime is obviously very repressive; they relied heavily on Chinese technology to identify people.
This shows the depth of China’s involvement in Iran and how it spread throughout the region. Operation Epic Fury is dismantling much of this. Because whatever comes next, they will have to be a non-hostile US actor. Otherwise, the United States will not approve it. With Trump personally involved in choosing which Ayatollah to deal with, China’s lack of access to a cooperative, open regime is a very serious concern.
You have written that “Beijing has invested heavily in Iran as a key structural asset in its Middle East strategy.” What can China realistically do to prevent the loss of this hugely important asset?
I think this is a type of asset that is very hard to replicate. Right now China is taking a balancing position, condemning Iran’s aggression against Gulf countries, because all these dynamics were actually for China to gain access to US allies, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which are very important.
They will recalibrate, but will need another country to use as a laboratory for sanctions and influence. Few countries will be open to that, as we see with Trump targeting not just Iran but also Venezuela, Ecuador, and Cuba.
The world will think twice about dealing with China precisely because it did not help Iran during the 12-day war and still does not.
So why did China not help? How long can it remain this balanced actor standing on the sidelines?
They did not and cannot help because they see Iran as a dying regime. Long before the strikes, inflation, youth unemployment, poor water management, and an inability to implement effective monetary policy were all clear to see. People were losing trust in the Rial.
All these indicators show a declining regime, which raises the question of whether China simply chose the rational path: not to prop up a dying state.
What does it do for China’s reputation, credibility, and commitments?
China cannot change what is already happening. There is little it can do while a military campaign dismantles every launcher and ballistic missile. The military superiority of Israelis and Americans has been extraordinary, so even leaks suggesting China may be sending targeting intelligence to Iran will not shift the balance of power. China did provide weapons beforehand, but it is not enough. The Islamic Republic’s problem is military: its broken chain of command makes an effective response nearly impossible, even with Chinese aid. Other countries are watching, but they also see that Iran is unpopular.
I mean, one of the things Iran did was target oil infrastructure in Gulf countries, despite the fact that some of those countries, for example Qatar, had played a constructive role for Tehran by relaying messages and facilitating communication. And yet they were still hit.
So China finds itself in a somewhat awkward position. It cannot fully distance itself from the Islamic Republic, but nor can it afford to alienate its Gulf partners.
Looking at possible end games, is it fair to say that any outcome short of the maximal US goal of a compliant Iran under US influence would still be manageable for Beijing?
I think so. If the operation leaves even a spark of hope for the Islamic Republic, China can still capitalize on some gains because the structure is already there. But it will be very hard for China to use Iran as it once did. Gulf countries are already expanding their security partnerships with the US, and the dividends of aligning with Israel are becoming clear; the UAE, for example, sees that.
Using Iran to disrupt US security architecture simply will not work anymore. Even if the Islamic Republic survives or shows a glimmer of hope, it will no longer play the same role. China also long counted on US fatigue with foreign interventions, assuming Washington would not act preemptively. This operation breaks that model and shows America is willing to act, changing China’s calculations after its bet on US decline.
How does that change China’s strategic thinking and decision making when it comes to Taiwan?
The US acting more unpredictably and preemptively is very important because the general consensus was that the US would not intervene in the Middle East. At the same time, the US is trying to bring Iran under a US security architecture.
This changes a lot for Taiwan, because China will lose access to sanctions evasion channels. It will not be able to weaponize or see proxies of Iran as helpful when countering the United States. And more importantly, I think it’s also empowering countries like Japan, who also are operating in the Global South, who also are strengthening the alliance system in Asia, especially with countries like Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.
They’re also watching China’s current unreliability. That’s something Japan can capitalize on. So, I think it’s changing a lot of parameters.
Obviously, I cannot 100% say what Xi Jinping is thinking, but I can tell you that this is the strategic environment that he’s operating in.
If it’s indeed all about China, then would it be fair to say that the diplomatic culmination of all this would be President Trump’s visit to China, which is reportedly being postponed? How big of a card would Iran be for Trump to hold when he goes to China?
I think he will want to hold the Iran card, the Cuba card, the Ecuador card, the Venezuela card, the rare earth card.
Let’s look at the Hormuz Strait. How long and how effectively can Iran play this card?
Not for long. It’s a very risky card that can only be played once. It needed to put maximum pressure on the US president to see oil prices increasing and say, “okay, we need to stop.” But Trump refused to change his position. Instead, he doubled down. The Iranians were hoping that it would kick off a huge debate in the United States and trigger some sort of reaction. It didn’t.
Does that also mean it won’t happen if it drags on?
I don’t think it can drag on, precisely because it’s harmful for China. This isn’t just about oil. It’s also about fertilizers, and the planting season is coming up very soon. In this operation, Iran is hurting its own partners, and I just don’t think they have the necessary military dominance to sustain it for long. Iran doesn’t have enough weapons or ammunition to maintain it. For that reason, I’m less pessimistic than many other analysts on this one.
One of the responses to the Hormuz Strait closure is the potential seizure of Kharg Island. How difficult and costly would it be to hold?
I don’t have a precise sense of the cost, but Trump mentioned it back in 1988, so it’s been on his mind for a long time. What matters is that even if Iran ramps up the threats, the United States is doubling down, escalating to establish deterrence. This is the real story that matters: that the Iranians have very few options left. And every day they have fewer. So I think they are being cornered.
How much of a game changer would a Kharg Island capture be, do you think?
It would be a huge game changer, at least for the Gulf countries. It would show that the United States is actually willing to follow through on every single one of its threats.
On Russia: with debate over whether Moscow is losing a key partner or benefiting from higher oil prices and temporary sanctions relief, is Russia ultimately a winner or a loser in this conflict?
Russia definitely loses a key partner that helped counter NATO. Most think of NATO’s eastern flank, but the southern flank is crucial too, and Iran played a huge role in weakening it, in Syria, Libya, and elsewhere too. Since NATO explicitly considers Iran a threat, this is overall bad news for Russia.
That said, Russia had partially decoupled from Iran after Syria and the fall of Bashar al-Assad. They no longer need Iran in Syria, Armenia, or Azerbaijan, and even transferred drone know-how to Russia in Tatarstan. From a dependency perspective, Russia is not as reliant on Iran as before, but Iran was still a critical partner in pushing back against NATO.
That’s, I think, a very big gain when we’re thinking about Ukraine. Obviously, people are talking about the sanctions and how they are making some gains. It’s true, the numbers speak for themselves. However, we have to also take into consideration the fact that Russia’s deficit and economy: no matter how many gains they’re making, it will not cover up for their structural economic failures.
They’re not in a very good shape. So I think that’s also something to take into consideration because it will be important in negotiations with the United States.
And will there be consequences for Russia providing intelligence support to Iran, even at the level of a slap on the wrist?
Yes. I think they are doing payback for the United States providing intelligence to Ukrainians.
But they are also playing with fire, because, for the last two years, they had a Trump that was willing to actually sit down and think about Russian interests. I think they are closing that window.
He’ll be less inclined to do so now?
I think so. Russia showing once more that it is targeting the United States will change a lot of the administration’s calculus.
In a recent piece, you argue that Europe has played a positive but largely behind the scenes role and that European allies have declined President Trump’s calls for public support. Do you expect repercussions from this apparent reluctance?
I think it’s too soon to see if there will be repercussions. My assessment so far is that there will be. Trump was hoping to show that there is a huge coalition he, the United States, can lead.
It’s flashier, more bombastic.
Exactly. There’s definitely a dramatic side to it. But when you’re dealing with China, Iran, and Russia, you want to have some kind of counter to that and show that it exists. The thing is, Europe is structurally incapable of doing that, even in the best-case scenario. It puts them in a strange position. Even though they’ve been absolutely crucial with sanctions and extremely helpful in Syria, they can’t publicly acknowledge it because of electoral considerations. I really wish a European leader had explicitly made the case for how Europe is helping and could help. I think it would have changed a lot of the discussions.
And finally, Turkey.
I think Turkey is also a winner in this, a big winner. Iran has always been a big problem for them in Syria and Iraq and elsewhere. That problem is vanishing, and it’s going to help them in their other projects. But the question for the United States will be how to reconcile Turkey with Israel, especially on Syria. I think that will be the big question of the next few years.
Interview by Vazha Tavberidze
