It is within the Black Sea basin that it seems appropriate to develop cooperation in two directions – security and political. Moreover, the creation of mini-alliances or blocs through the convergence of interests due to geographical proximity is one of the notable trends of the modern world. Their practical benefits include, among other things, better perception and assessment of shared risks, as well as mobility of joint responses to address them and more efficient use of resources.
The formation of the Black Sea mini-alliance is all the more relevant if we take into account that in recent years the representation of the North Atlantic Alliance in the Black Sea has been characterized by a significant lack of potential and resources. Moreover, on the eastern flank of the alliance perimeter – from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea – this sense of scarcity was compounded by apparent asymmetry or inequality. The result was and remains corresponding. Namely, against the backdrop of the disparity between the components of the Alliance’s so-called tailored forward presence on the Black Sea and so-called enhanced forward presence of Baltic countries, NATO’s approach is inexplicable, because the security of the Black Sea today requires at least the same standards of attitude as the northern part of the Alliance’s eastern flank.
Thus, if we focus on the political component, we still want to put forward the initiative of a framework document of the Black Sea Declaration, which would serve the political and economic integration of the countries of the region, including a modern format of consultations, adapted to the time and the need for new channels of communication.
Such a declaration will emphasize the importance of the Black Sea region for world and regional peace and stability. With regard to a number of important topics, this document will:
(1) Highlight the importance of partnership of the parties for regional security;
(2) Consider the region as an area free from harmful influences and “areas of special interest”;
(3) Indicate the need to mobilize investment funds for the diversification of regional infrastructure, as well as the need to implement socially and environmentally sustainable projects in the region;
(4) Note the frozen so-called ethnic, and in fact geopolitical conflicts, and express support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries of the Black Sea region;
(5) Create a platform to discuss current regional security issues, such as those related to terrorism and illegal migration challenges;
(6) Outline the directions of regional free trade agreements and blocs.
At the same time, in order to ensure the necessary coordination, consideration should be given to holding regular summits at the level of high-level representatives of the heads of state parties of the declaration, the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union and other strategic partners. The main purpose of the regular summits is to support the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries of the region; Summit participants should also discuss actual geopolitical (rather than so-called “ethnic”) conflicts in the region, regional security in general, international terrorism, cyber security, illegal migration and other pressing issues and challenges.
As for the security dimension using the regional factor of the Black Sea, we envision the relevant cooperation (similar to NORDEFCO or another model) by joint efforts of the North Atlantic Alliance member countries (Romania, Turkey, Bulgaria) and non-member countries (Georgia, Ukraine).
And the area of cooperation issues presumably appears to us as follows:
(1) Discussing security and defense policy and identifying common risks and challenges;
(2) Concern for the interaction and interoperability of armed forces, including through the planning of specific programs and measures;
(3) Exchange of experience and knowledge in the field of defense industry and related technologies;
(4) Joint actions to ensure peace and stability in the Black Sea region.
It is clear that certain aspects of such cooperation require detailed discussion at the expert level, but with the necessary condition that such discussion is encouraged and facilitated by decision-makers.
- Enhancing the geo-economic function
We deliberately emphasized this component in the context of the article. We believe that, on the one hand, increasing a country’s usefulness in a network of regional trade, transportation or other types of economic linkages and, on the other hand, the joint interest and co-ownership of actors with a voice in realizing these benefits will help to better manage and mitigate future risks.
Realistically speaking, in today’s opportunistic world, we consider ties based on mutual benefit to be one of the main prerequisites for stability and predictability. The rest – declarations, statements and supporting resolutions – will only be lifeless noise if there is no concrete content of economic co-beneficiary and co-ownership behind them.
The above-mentioned approach was the basis for the cross-border projects launched by Georgia in the 1990s (Baku-Supsa, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum, and later Baku-Tbilisi-Kars), which gave our country “its own self” in the eyes of the outside world. However, it is necessary to remember that strengthening the “own self” and filling it with new content is a constant, continuous process in which fatigue and boredom are excluded. A number of major projects, including the Middle Corridor and the Black Sea Electric Cable, which should give Georgia a unique role in the larger regional geo-economic structure, at least for several decades to come, serve this very purpose.
Here we will add what we have said many times. In particular, the country’s concern is the existence of a competitive ecosystem in its own space. Now, if we imagine for a moment the growing trend of economic autarky and nationalism on a global scale, needless to say, such a Georgian ecosystem should at least not lag behind competitors of similar caliber. For this purpose, among other measures, it is necessary to: (a) increase tenfold the integration of the Georgian economy with developed economies; (b) increase technological and intellectual self-sufficiency; (c) promote science and education adapted to the needs of a practical economy; (d) maximize Georgia’s use of the “friendshoring” potential within regional and subregional industrial and transport and logistics networks.
The fact is, if we somehow turn this country into a geography of economic gravity for powerful actors, the likelihood of overt military or other threats (including those related to “gray operations”) will be proportionately reduced.
A few theses to conclude
Judging by the regional processes around Georgia, yes, direct aggression is still a possible scenario. However, I would add that the probability of such aggression, based on the current circumstances, is low.
Instead, the pursuit of “low-intensity” conflict through “gray operations” directed against a country is a permanent phenomenon and will remain so for the foreseeable future.
Moreover, in case the support of the West for Georgia becomes unconvincing for the same Russian Federation and if external forces manage and create a crack in the will and strength of our government to adequately respond to anti-Georgian and anti-state actions, the relevance of open aggression from outside will decrease even more.
It should be noted here that Russia’s so-called “Salami Tactics” can be no less effective for a country of Georgia’s size and scale than a conventional military campaign. It may be as a result of such “gradual”, “step-by-step” pressure – whether in the economic or informational sphere – that Russia can exert the desired influence on our country’s domestic political structure and its foreign policy course.
Considering the above, the strengthening of Georgia’s ties with Western partners is given critical weight. In our opinion, one of the real manifestations of this cooperation is the establishment in Tbilisi of a special joint center of excellence for combating hybrid warfare and disinformation, for example, in the form of an analog of the center for combating hybrid threats operating in Helsinki. In parallel with the neutralization of hybrid-disinformation manifestations in our country (the so-called “Global War Party”, “Second Front”, “Standing Firmly on Two Feet”, etc.), such a center can also respond to the needs of the regional scale.
It is a fact that as the world and the South Caucasus region enter an era of instability and unpredictability, there is a growing demand for the so-called “opportunistic” approach in the external arena. And if the use of the word “opportunism” in the above-mentioned context offends someone’s ears, we can call this much-needed approach much more correctly – “Georgian policy of realistic opportunities”.
By Victor Kipiani
