The shift of Georgian-American relations into a realistic plane is driven by the primary demand of the modern world: finding practical interests between the parties, “processing” them appropriately, and realizing them in everyday politics without sentimentality or ideology.
What time has brought us:
In such times, the main defining principle is correctly selected reciprocity: what we give and what we receive in return. Speaking with empathy and ideological clichés is truly useless here, because in a world saturated with “consumer” culture, the most important thing is to understand exactly:
• What is expected of you;
• What you are willing to give in response to the partner country’s expectations; and
• What resources you have to bargain for your own interests.
The use of the word “bargaining” does not cause me personal discomfort, and I urge the reader to feel the same: do not shrink away from the introduction of new conversational and negotiation techniques and diplomatic culture from the Georgian side in this newly formed, unsystematic system of relations. I believe that only through dry rationalism, within the context of Georgia’s realistic capabilities, will we be able to:
• Make them understand what we want;
• Understand what they want; and
• Find the right middle ground.
This is exactly the approach offered by the current administration of the United States. It only remains for us not to become confused, to perceive it adequately, to adapt to the proposed signature style, and by mastering it, move toward a new framework for Georgian-American relations by prioritizing Georgia.
Regarding this, I will highlight several considerations as basic material for further discussion. However, before detailing them, I also consider it necessary to state two very fundamental conditions…
Specifically, that:
(1) the views voiced in this annotation require a broad socio-political consensus within the Georgian space.
The point is that the practical implementation of these ideas between Georgia and the U.S. will result not only in a completely new character of bilateral relations, but also in a qualitatively different content for the Georgian state’s foreign policy and security lines. As a result of such transformation, Georgia’s positioning, both in its immediate neighborhood and in the surrounding region, will change significantly.
(2) only a Georgia of a new political-social formation can serve as the initiator for achieving and operationalizing the aforementioned consensus.
The reason for such statements is that the passing years and the status quo make the current governing circles, as well as the current form of governance, absolutely inappropriate for solving the challenges facing the country and for adapting to the demands of modern times.
Regarding Specifics:
1. For the purpose of our country’s real security and defense, the new socio-political formation, prioritizing Georgia first, must deliberately develop and bring forward the following key topics for consideration:
(1) Defense Spending: The national budget must allocate defense expenditures that are sufficient to support both the national defense system and the necessary cooperation between Georgia and the US in this field.
This approach will create the prerequisites for overcoming the lag of the Georgian Armed Forces compared to regional countries and for their modernization, as well as for a real, action-based bilateral security format between Georgia and the US.
(2) Military-Industrial Cooperation: Establishing an appropriate format for military-industrial cooperation between the two countries, including the design and joint production of defense systems.
Beyond direct security goals, this will promote the development of Georgian scientific potential and access to modern technologies, not to mention the positive effect on the Georgian labor market.
(3) Infrastructure Access: Offering the American side access to Georgian infrastructure for the projection of US interests in the region.
Note: This is a “double-edged sword” concept. While it provides a concrete security mechanism for Georgia, its implementation involves specific risks; most notably, turning our country into a potential target for US adversaries. However, this proposal must be evaluated through a “SWOT” analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) of assets and liabilities. We must agree that in the modern world:
• Absolute security does not exist; promising it is a fiction.
• Caring for national security requires a reciprocal contribution (“only cheese in a mousetrap is free”).
• Effective relations regarding real security are impossible without reciprocity between the parties.
2. For the purpose of economic sustainability and development, the new formation, prioritizing Georgia first, should open negotiations with the American side to sign a Trade and Economic Agreement (an expanded version of a Free Trade Agreement). Such an agreement would:
(1) help Georgian and American economic actors gain preferential access to their respective markets and attract capital and technology.
(2) provide for an investment screening mechanism in Georgia to eliminate or minimize investments made for non-economic purposes or hidden geopolitical motives.
(3) address the reduction and/or management of dependence on a single source of energy supply.
3. To synchronize the policies of the two countries in the Wider Black Sea region and strengthen regional supply lines, the Georgian and American sides should consider practical means for:
(1) establishing joint ventures in our country.
(2) entering into long-term procurement contracts with regional suppliers.
(3) creating appropriate joint logistics for necessary stockpiles.
Conclusion:
A framework relationship built on the political will of both sides, proper competence, and reasonably arranged reciprocal obligations will give cooperation between the two countries a systematic framework, solidity, modern content, and necessary clarity.
Through such cooperation, our country will gain additional opportunities to reduce and manage the risks of undesirable pressure on its foreign course, hybrid interference in internal affairs, or external aggression.
Analysis by Victor Kipiani, Georgia First / Geocase
