In the era of intense great power competition, ideas matter, as they shore up great powers’ claims for global economic and political primacy. The US has long been the one which dominated these two areas. Now it is China which increasingly tries to position itself as a responsible world player. Surely, its success is far from guaranteed, as much depends on a variety of geopolitical variables. Yet the trend is obvious: Beijing is advancing its own multilateral institutions and various security initiatives which would allow it to cement its global clout.
China is gradually moving towards unveiling its ideas regarding the world order it foresees. We do not know much, but recently some elements, albeit incomplete, of its vision have emerged. The Global Security Initiative unveiled by Chinese President Xi Jinping in April 2020, during his keynote speech at the Boao Forum for Asia Annual Conference, offered a glimpse into the Chinese thinking, but most of all signaled China’s global ambitions beyond the merely economic sphere. Rather, it aims at something bigger, at constructing a framework within which China could maneuver, but most of all displace the Western security architecture. Critical elements in the GSI include the concept of indivisible security, respect for territorial integrity of all states, and the embrace of the UN Charter. Other points, however, are vague.
The Global Security Initiative (GSI) was presented during Xi’s speech on the Global Development Initiative (GDI) at the Seventy-Sixth United Nations General Assembly. So far, the two ideas evoke many questions, but they do show how conscious China has recently become regarding the need to present alternative concepts of state-to-state relations. The thinking in Beijing is that superseding the US global order requires not only pinpointing the failures of the liberal system, but more importantly, presenting viable alternatives.
The GSI and GDI seek to construct a new order which will be more conducive to Chinese interests. As said, not much is known about the two initiatives, and it is likely that we will see China elucidating concrete details in the coming years. Beijing will look closely at how the concepts are received worldwide and will act accordingly. As has happened with other Chinese initiatives from the past, we might see fundamental changes too in the GSI and GDI as the competition with the US is expanding. This happened with the Chinese flagship project – the Belt and Road Iniatiave (BRI). Instead of looking at it as a static concept, the BRI has shown its adaptability to rising to challenges and new opportunities. This means that the GSI and GDI should not be dismissed either.
These initiatives are a clear indication that Beijing began to think beyond shaping the global economy and now is venturing more actively into shaping global affairs. The GSI and GDI could be a logical continuation of the BRI. If the latter was about reshaping the Eurasian infrastructure, it did not address security challenges posed by terrorism, extremism and, most of all, competition and open rivalry from other powers. To this should be added a number of events that shook global security and perhaps accelerated the unveiling of the initiatives. From Covid-19 and the chaotic US withdrawal from Afghanistan, to the US’ recalibration of its position in the Middle East and Russia’s war in Ukraine, the competition between the two emerging blocs, however loose, requires adaptation from Beijing.
The GSI and GDI could thus be seen as ideas addressing these challenges. Geopolitical context is crucial here. The war in Ukraine exacerbated the great power competition in Eurasia. Importantly for China, the war helped the West regain momentum and increase its effectiveness and show resolve by supporting Ukraine. A stronger West, and especially a NATO which is ever-interested in expanding its gaze to the Indo-Pacific region, is a headache for Beijing, which has required a Chinese conceptual response. The success of GSI and GDI is not predetermined, however. It is likely, though, that these ideas will be more welcome in countries which generally seek closer ties with China and have troubled record of bilateral relations with the US.
The novelty in the GSI is the “indivisible security” concept. Originally a European idea developed during the Cold War, GSI takes a holistic approach to security. No single country’s security should be achieved at the expense of its neighbor. As the Chinese global initiatives grow in number, the intensity of Beijing-Washington competition will be ever more acute and cover nearly all areas of bilateral ties pushing many countries to make radical foreign policy choices.
Analysis by Emil Avdaliani
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of silk roads.
