Interview by Vazha Tavberidze
“It’s not that Ukraine doesn’t have cards — it doesn’t have any other option than to fight. Because surrender means death. It means the end of Ukraine as an independent nation,” says Anton Shekhovtsov, a Ukrainian political scientist and chair at the Centre for Democratic Integrity, an Austria-based think tank, in response to a recent report published by the newly established Center for Geopolitics, launched by JPMorgan Chase. The report outlines four possible endgame scenarios for the Russia-Ukraine war — including what it calls the “Georgia scenario,” which envisions a weakened Ukraine slowly drifting back into Russia’s sphere of influence — and claims that negotiations to end the war could be concluded by the end of 2025.
In this interview with RFE/RL’s Georgian Service, Shekhovtsov challenges the assumptions behind the report, questions the timing and intent of its conclusions, and explains why, in his view, neither a “Georgian” nor a “Belarusian” scenario is viable — or even possible — for Ukraine. Instead, he argues, the war is about Ukraine’s very survival — and whether the West is prepared to treat that survival as a matter of its own existential interest.
Before we go through the scenarios outlined by this report, there is an interesting passage — or rather, conclusion — that I wanted to ask about. It says that “the end is near [for the Ukraine war], that negotiations will be concluded by the end of the year.” Is that how you see it as well? Is the end truly near?
No, not at all. I don’t see a quick end to this war, and this is one of my core criticisms of that report — although there are quite a few unknowns that might have influenced their train of thought and the eventual conclusion. We don’t know when exactly the report was written — was it before the talks between the Americans and the Russians, and then the Ukrainians and the Russians, which all failed, in my opinion? But the feeling, probably on the part of JPMorgan Chase, or their experts, was that — well, here we go, this is about to end.
If you write your report based on forthcoming talks that then break down, surely you don’t publish those conclusions without revising them?
Well, they probably don’t share the feeling that everything has broken down. Another thing we don’t know is what the relationship is between the authors of the report and the Trump administration — or rather, how much access they have. Trump famously said that he would end the conflict in 24 hours. Of course, that’s an exaggeration — I understand that — but still, the major unknown is the nature of those relations between JPMorgan Chase and the Trump administration. Their point essentially is that Ukraine — to use a Trumpian expression — has no cards. That Zelensky is running out of everything: resources, time, and people. So Ukraine has no cards — and at the same time, they write that Putin also is not in a very good position, and it is unclear whether Europe would be able to step in and compensate for the cutoff of American aid. So they arrive at the conclusion that if all this is true, then surely talks and some sort of negotiation must be imminent, right? I don’t think it’s that simple. For one, even if the Americans were to withdraw completely from assisting Ukraine, it’s a dumb thing to claim that Ukraine would fall. That wouldn’t happen anytime soon. It may happen in the future — which is something I’ve also written about — but definitely not this year. One reason is that Europe now feels that it is in its existential interest to help Ukraine for as long as possible. According to a growing number of reports from European intelligence services, Russia will be able to regroup and rearm within a period of five years — some reports even say three years. But that period starts from the fall of Ukraine. So the longer Ukraine stands, the more time Europe has to prepare itself. So even if the US withdraws, I think Europe will just start buying weapons from the US. So no, the end is not near. It’s not even in sight yet.
Putin’s regime has a problem with the mere existence of a Ukrainian nation
Out of the four possible scenarios, the highest probability — 50% — was given to the “Georgian scenario,” according to which, I quote, “Without foreign troops or strong military support, Ukraine would face instability, hindered recovery, declining international backing, and a stalled path to Western integration, risking a slow return to Russia’s sphere of influence.” You don’t agree with this, saying that the stakes are vastly different, and that Putin doesn’t see a Georgian scenario for Ukraine. However, given what’s been happening in Georgia these last few years, would a Ukraine modeled after today’s Georgia necessarily be against Putin’s interests? Isn’t it just bringing Ukraine one step closer to eventual demise?
Indeed. The Georgian scenario for Ukraine would merely be a transitory period for Putin. What I argued in my essay is that Georgia and Ukraine are two very different things for Putin. For Putin — his personality, his background and experiences, even his upbringing — all play a vital role in how he approaches this. Putin doesn’t have a problem with Georgia as a nation, with its existence as a nation. The war against Georgia in 2008, and the political war before and after, was to cripple Georgia’s independence.
How much of that “not having a problem with Georgia as a nation” translates into “I don’t have a problem with Georgia as a nation, as long as it does as I say”? Doesn’t that undermine the entire point of sovereignty?
Yes, but with Ukraine, he’s not prepared even for that — for the “I don’t mind Kyiv, as long as they do as they are told” kind of arrangement. Crippling Ukraine — that phase belongs to the past: 2014, annexation of Crimea, the war in Donbas, and so on. In 2022 and ever since, the stakes have been completely different for him. Now, when he is occupying Ukrainian land, he’s not building a friendly Ukraine there. He’s building Russia. He annexes those territories to Russia. And this is something even different from what Stalin did. Ukrainian identity is being completely erased from those territories — because for Putin, they are no longer Ukraine. It’s Russia. That’s the point. It is the complete destruction of the Ukrainian state.
And that is an even worse scenario than the one the report designates as the worst — the Belarus scenario. Because Belarus, at least to this point and formally, is still Belarus and not Russia.
Exactly. What is happening with the annexed territories? They are turned into Russian oblasts. Putin’s problem isn’t with having a friendly Ukraine. Putin’s regime has a problem with the mere existence of a Ukrainian nation.
It’s not that Ukraine doesn’t have cards — it doesn’t have any other option than to fight
It’s not much of a choice to make, but if one had to — what would Ukraine opt for today, the Georgian scenario or the Belarusian?
Well, you can imagine that the answer is the Georgian scenario. Because you live in Georgia, you work for Radio Free Europe. You can do this — talk to me and then publish the interview. That can’t happen if you live in Belarus. So obviously, if the choice is between Georgia and Belarus, Ukrainians — with a gun pointed at them — will opt for the former. But I want to reiterate: this is no longer a choice — not even the Belarusian one. His full-scale invasion is not merely about conquest, but about eradication. He has realized, possibly during the Covid lockdown, that he doesn’t have enough time to do a “smart occupation” without bloodshed, with hybrid/political warfare, grey zones, Kremlin-friendly governments, and so on. He has realized that if he wants to get it done in his lifetime — and by “it” I mean getting back at the West, the whole geopolitical revisionism — then Ukraine is merely an instrument in an eternal war against the West. It’s not just about NATO. For them, it’s so much older than NATO. For Putin, Patrushev, Naryshkin, Medinsky and others, the West has been waging war against Russia for centuries. It’s not just a belief — it’s something closer to faith at this point. A religion. They believe in this. And they see an independent Ukraine as a Western instrument against Russia. So if we aim for geopolitical revision — the revision of the results of the Cold War — then we have to strike at the Western instrument. And that is the mere existence of Ukraine. So it’s not that Ukraine doesn’t have cards — it doesn’t have any other option than to fight. Because surrender means death. It means the end of Ukraine as an independent nation. It could perhaps survive as an ethnic group, or even a nation — but without a state. That’s the Kremlin objective.
So if Ukraine doesn’t have a choice, and if Russia — at least under Putin — is locked in this frenzied desire to eradicate Ukraine, then as it stands, the only player that has a choice in how to act is the West, right? What options does it have? And why do you think the Georgian scenario was designated as the most probable one?
I think JPMorgan Chase is trying to show that, essentially, Ukraine has already lost. I think that’s the message. But if it is a message — a message to whom? Is it a message to Ukraine, or a message to the West? And now we have two parts of the West: the US, which is a very shaky member of the West, and Europe. I suppose this is a message to Europe. And as a global financial institution, JP Morgan Chase should be very much interested in the stability of the European Union. But there will be no stability of the European Union if Ukraine falls. And you don’t even have to like Ukraine to understand that it is in your vital existential interest to keep Ukraine fighting. Probably have some kind of a win for Ukraine. They do have these two options, two scenarios laid out: The South Korea and Israel ones. So it’s viable. So this is probably a message to the EU: if they don’t step up, if they don’t compensate for the possible withdrawal of the US from this conflict, if they do a Georgia 2008 instead – then Europe will have problems.
