What we say briefly in the introduction will serve as the conclusion to this article. However, we will deliberately summarize here what we want to say, so that we can then focus on individual, specific issues of our discussion.
The prevailing view and assessment now is that the coming months may prove decisive for the fate of the war in Ukraine. Some will say, and they will be right, that any stage in the course of such an armed conflict is equally important. Yes, it is. However, the recent situation on the battlefield has brought the current stage closer to a critical one. According to the general opinion of military experts, it has entered the phase of a positional confrontation of a debilitating type. At the same time, this formulation, against the background of the relative advantage gained by the Russians on land and several highly successful Ukrainian operations in the Black Sea area, does not at all indicate stagnation of hostilities. Despite this, overall the war has reached a stalemate, meaning that the parties lack the resources and capabilities to achieve the goals of victory proclaimed by them.
In parallel, contradictory events are also developing in the Western world. At the time of writing this article, US President Biden is still trying to convince Congress to approve an increase in the next round of military aid to Ukraine. And the EU is gradually realizing that a confrontation with Russia could last for years, requiring a radical reorganization of its economy and military order.
It should also be noted that as the war drags on, criticism of Ukraine’s current government is increasing both inside and outside the country. In addition to the psychological exhaustion caused by constant stress, such criticism is amplified by the failure of the 2023 counterattack, as well as numerous suspicions of corruption.
Given these and other circumstances, after inflated expectations for 2022 and the appearance of moderation of those expectations in 2023, the main question now relates to the realism of expectations for 2024.
It is clear that in order to get closer to an answer to this crucial question, many relevant topics of war and peace, as well as international relations and security, must be rethought, and this requires a multi-page work which is quite impossible at the moment, so we will only talk about a few selectively important issues.
Winning and Losing
There can be no two opinions that Ukraine must win and Russia must lose. This is what morality demands, what the law demands, what the countries that have suffered from the violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity demand, what the current and tomorrow’s interests of civilized nations demand. This is such an axiom that any extended discussion would insult the axiom itself.
Despite this fundamental truth, in the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine as a result of Russian aggression, the question of how to practically understand Ukraine’s “victory” and Russia’s “defeat” is still a matter of interpretation. This interpretive difficulty is compounded by the operational (executive) difficulty of ensuring Kyiv’s victory and Moscow’s defeat.
The complexity of both categories is largely objective: The war between Russia and Ukraine after the end of World War II represents an entirely new type of interstate military confrontation. That is why there are no ready-made recipes aimed at its solution or completion, and the change in the content of the concepts of “victory” and “defeat” occurs in the course of changing dynamics of military actions and international politics.
It is also a fact that time is working against Ukrainians in terms of military operations. The basis for such assertion is the huge human and material losses, as well as the uncertainty that has arisen in the military sphere. The latter is exacerbated by the well-known contradictions of Western domestic politics, the haphazardness of the defense industry in Europe, the inadequate response to Ukraine’s needs, the protracted and costly war between Israel and Hamas in the Middle East, and Donald Trump’s campaign in the United States, which, even before the election results are in, is seriously affecting the foreign and security line of this highly critical country with respect to the Russia-Ukraine military conflict.
The military specifics of the current war are well known to readers: They are actively and regularly covered in various sources. It is also widely known what advantages the aggressor has at this stage (timely readjustment to a war economy, creation of new markets and suppliers in terms of technology supply, cheap human resources, total control over internal processes, etc.), where and why the victim of aggression has difficulties (lack of human resources, shortage of advanced military equipment, significant delays in delivery of promised conventional weapons, deficiencies in command planning for a new type of war, etc.).
Thus, we will not repeat the military and field aspects and will save our and the reader’s time. Undoubtedly, both the West and Ukraine need a critical reassessment of reality, and the sooner the better. Otherwise, it will be very difficult to achieve a tangible result called “victory” in operational and practical terms.
We have mentioned a new, modern type of war between states, and here we will add something else. In such a war, the result cannot always be expressed geographically – by one or another configuration of the front line on the map. In other words, the success of international efforts in the war between Russia and Ukraine cannot be considered only the end of hostilities with the desired result. At such times, it is equally, if not more, important to prevent the potential threat of renewed aggression by an aggressor state after the end of the war. This is a much more complex task that cannot be accomplished by military means alone.
Futility of diplomacy?
One of the main explanations for the “disarmament” of diplomatic efforts could be found in the lack of a clear understanding of the end of the war (endgame). Parallel to the victory-loss equation in the military context, from the beginning of the war until today there has been a high degree of fluctuation in the diplomatic-political arena. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the West’s syndrome of geopolitical ambivalence toward certain countries, including Georgia, spilled over with some inertia into the Russian-Ukrainian war. Today, especially given US domestic developments, this syndrome is characterized by “strategic uncertainty” or “strategic haze” and raises a number of uncomfortable questions. As an illustration, suffice it to cite two diametrically different phrases from the US President Biden regarding Ukraine: one in May 2022 about supporting “as long as we need to” and the other in December 2023 about “as long as we are able to.”
We are well aware of how trite, and for some, irritating is the phrase that any war ends in negotiation. However, the reality is that humanity has never seen an unfinished war, and virtually all military conflicts have ended with a ceasefire agreement or a politically viable peace agreement. Both outcomes are unthinkable without diplomacy.
Along with timely and effective military assistance to Ukraine, diplomatic pressure must be equally critical, unambiguously sincere and firm
We think that at the current stage of the war in Ukraine it is extremely difficult to achieve either of the two mentioned above. In particular, it is still objectively impossible to reach a peace agreement between the warring parties. This is impossible insofar as Russia does not recognize Ukraine’s state sovereignty, its international borders and continues its open aggression. In addition, along with a final settlement of pressing political issues, a peace agreement should also address matters such as humanitarian issues, reparations, and criminal offenses. Even setting aside for a moment the issues of sovereignty and territorial integrity, the reader will agree that only an objective investigation of war crimes and punishment of the perpetrators can be an insurmountable obstacle to a peace agreement. However, it is groundless to talk about a peace agreement today as it is, since the positions of Ukraine and Russia on political conditions are radically different, which is natural. A clear example of this huge difference in positions is the recent interview of the Russian President with journalist Tucker Carlson, in which the aggressor’s goal is again called the complete surrender of Ukraine, surrender of occupied territories, demilitarization and denazification. Obviously, all of this is non-starter (doomed to failure from the outset) for the peace talks.
Under the current circumstances, it is equally difficult to agree on a ceasefire truce. The crucial issue here is to ensure the stability and inviolability of the ceasefire in such a way that it does not lead, intentionally or unintentionally, to a larger-scale resumption of the hot phase of the conflict in the future. It is no coincidence that in a cerain source even the Second World War is considered a continuation of the unfinished First World War (and this when the armistice of the First World War was replaced by peace agreements a little later).
Speaking of these contradictions, let us recall a relatively positive precedent, namely the armistice related to the Korean peninsula, for the conclusion of which the beginning of communication between the parties coincided not with the subsidence of hostilities, but with their intensification. Moreover, it took the parties two years to reach the actual signing of an approximately forty-page ceasefire agreement. This may not be a particularly convincing argument to a large part of the audience, but perhaps it is a kind of argument that diplomacy is necessary and practically useful in a conflict of any type and scale.
It is also clear that the sustainability of a ceasefire agreement should be determined by a number of practical components. Conventionally, we would divide them into two groups, where one group refers to the operational side of such an agreement and includes, for instance, demilitarized zones, guarantees by a third party (or parties), the functioning of peacekeepers, a mechanism for resolving disputes, etc. It is also important that the language of the agreement be as specific as possible and leave no room for broad interpretation by the parties; Furthermore, a truce agreement should maximize reciprocity between the parties and deter them from using force.
The so-called second group should encourage Ukraine to sign such an agreement, i.e. it should include such components as: implementation of a reliable and credible security system for the country, a serious program and appropriate investments to rebuild the Ukrainian economy, maintenance of the promised sanctions regime against Russia, and firm recognition of the country’s international borders, including the temporarily occupied territories.
Thus, we believe that the place of diplomacy is not “superfluous” during the ongoing war in Ukraine, and its silencing or postponement will directly affect both the dynamics of the current conflict and the fate of specific people – the fate of those who are so often forgotten when discussing theoretical and practical aspects of war and diplomacy and unwittingly treated as dry statistics. We believe that now is the time when all methods should be tried, even if they seem completely or so far unpromising. Any other approach will be directly linked to an increase in the scale of the war and direct and indirect damage. Along with timely and effective military assistance to Ukraine, diplomatic pressure must be equally critical, unambiguously sincere and firm, not illusory and half-hearted. Otherwise, as already mentioned, failure first occurs gradually and then happens all at once.
To be continued in next week’s GT.
Analysis by Victor Kipiani, Geocase Chairman
