Interview by Vazha Tavberidze
As mass protests continue to roil Serbia and Georgia, both countries find themselves walking a tightrope between democracy and creeping autocracy, with Moscow’s shadow looming large over both. Aleksandar Djokic, Serbian political analyst and former assistant professor at RUDN Moscow, spoke to RFE/RL’s Georgian Service to unpack what binds these two struggles, what sets them apart, and why geography, and Russia, still dictate so much of the political playbook in both capitals.
What would you say are the major similarities and differences between the protests in Georgia and Serbia?
Well, both Georgia and Serbia have hybrid regimes, somewhere between democracy and autocracy. Obviously, the Georgian regime has in recent years slid further into outright autocracy. The Vučić regime, we can say, still sits on the fence, maybe closer to Orbán’s model, because they are neighbors and regime partners in some sense. Autocracies, just like democracies, pick up tactics and tricks from one another.
The main difference, though, is one that cannot really be changed — geography. Georgia borders Russia, Serbia borders mostly EU and NATO countries. So there are red lines that Serbia’s regime simply cannot cross without risking sanctions, and those sanctions would really hurt, because the regime has no alternative source of growth or investment. That’s crucial. Serbia doesn’t even have access to the sea. When Lavrov wanted to fly to Serbia after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, he couldn’t, as neighboring countries closed their airspace. He was blocked. So in that sense, Serbia is enclosed. But that’s not entirely a bad thing: Serbia is enclosed by democratic, mostly peaceful neighbors, and trades with them. This “encirclement” sets clear limits: no regime can overstep.
Vučić, of course, learned the lessons of Milosevic’s downfall well: he was part of the Milosevic regime. He was Minister of Information in 1998–99, during the Kosovo War and the NATO bombing. So he saw first-hand what red lines not to cross. That’s why his regime is very careful — they won’t start wars, obviously, and they also avoid large-scale repression.
Yes, there is repression, but it is limited, targeted: it hits student groups or protest organizers, mostly to scare people from joining. It’s more about intimidation than mass punishment. They don’t want a Belarus scenario — mass arrests after protests, like in 2020.
So, this democratic “encirclement” works as a deterrent. But what about Russia’s influence? Where does it run deeper, Serbia or Georgia?
Good question. If we’re talking about hearts and minds, propaganda, then I’d say Russia’s footprint is deeper in Serbia. Georgia, after all, fought a direct war with Russia. For Georgians, Russia is the foreign power taking away parts of their territory. Serbia had almost the opposite experience. And you have to understand, while we know Russia’s policies in the 1990s were wrong, and things could have been handled differently, that resentment from the wars is still mostly directed at the West.
Of course, this needs to be nuanced. The EU and NATO are not the same in Serbian eyes. The EU gets mixed feelings, but if Serbia were truly close to joining, a clear majority would support it. The EU is seen as a source of wealth, investment, and development. People want that economic prosperity. But the resentment about the wars of the 90s lingers — the West is still blamed by many for those defeats, not Milosevic’s regime.
The Novi Sad protesters, the thousands still coming out into the streets, are demanding more democracy in the country. But at least some harbor sympathies towards Russia. Is that a correct reading of the situation?
We have the liberal protesters, and alongside them we have nationalists also protesting. They are protesting together because all of them see that Vučić is doing something wrong. The liberals see Vučić as pro-Russian, anti-democratic, and that, under this regime, Serbia will never join the EU. The nationalists, on the other hand, see him as not tough enough on Kosovo, cooperating too much with the West, giving them resources or investments — exactly how Milosevic was seen before his downfall.
Part of society saw Milosevic as a bloody dictator, a war criminal; the other part saw him as a national traitor who never stood up to the West hard enough, always compromising and then capitulating. And all these people came together to protest him. They protested together, even if their views were basically irreconcilable.
It’s the same now. The student protest movement tries to avoid the ideological questions and focus on democracy, corruption, rule of law, replacing the Vučić regime, because there is no other way. Of course, these are liberal democratic values — European values: democracy, transparency, anti-corruption, rule of law, free media. All of this is what the EU wants to see in Serbia. These goals are not in contradiction with Serbia’s relations with the West, but they are not viewed geopolitically, are not seen as “we want to replace Vučić with a more pro-Western government” or “a more pro-Russian government.” But yes, there are these two camps inside the protest — sometimes they clash, sometimes they criticize each other, but in the end, they all protest together.
Let’s talk about Russia’s leverage: for Serbia it’s Kosovo, for Georgia it’s South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
And Russia also has gas leverage in Serbia. The gas contract has yet to be renewed. It was automatically prolonged for four months, because that’s in the contract, but a new deal hasn’t been negotiated yet. And, of course, there is also the propaganda leverage, because the regime presents itself to its own voters as very pro-Russian, very close to Russia. Putin always steps in — that’s leverage for Vučić’s electorate. For Vučić’s voters, it matters more what Putin says about Vučić than what Trump or Ursula von der Leyen say. They’ve been led to believe for 13 years now that Vučić and Putin are close, that they always support each other. This regime’s propaganda has drilled this in: that Vučić is a secret pro-Russian nationalist with a secret “Great Serbia” agenda, but he can’t show it too openly because then he’d be sanctioned or replaced by the West. So he has to pretend, “but his heart is with Russia.” That’s what they want the people to believe.
All this talk of color revolutions, foreign agents, Western money, coups — you know this well, you were educated in Russia. How much of this comes straight from the Kremlin playbook?
For months now, Russian officials have been openly backing Vučić — they are the only ones openly framing these protests as some kind of color revolution organized by the West. No other big powers do that. China is neutral, not really involved, or maybe not that interested. They have a lot of investment in Serbia, and likely believe their capital is safe no matter who comes to power. So they don’t push this narrative.
Inside Serbia, the regime itself uses this talk — color revolutions, foreign plots — but they don’t go as far as saying “the US is behind this” or “the EU is behind that.” Milosevic’s regime did that, as Lukashenko’s regime did later, but they were already in open conflict with the West and had nothing to lose.
Here, the Vučić regime flirted with that narrative when the Trump administration started to weaken its soft power and cut USAID. For a short while, the regime pushed that line too, claiming the protests were funded by USAID, but they didn’t want to say “it’s the US,” or more, “it’s Biden.” They jumped on that bandwagon but got a cold shoulder from Trump’s side. The Trump administration didn’t care to actively engage in the Balkans, didn’t come out supporting Vučić, though they didn’t oppose him either. Remember when Vučić travelled to Florida to meet Trump? He was rejected, claimed he fell ill, flew back across the ocean, and then went straight to the Moscow parade a few days later.
What’s the reputational and strategic cost for both governments, especially on the international stage?
The Vucic regime must pay attention not to use excessive force, or to use it too often, or to use it on a mass scale, because the world is watching — and those are the red lines I mentioned at the start. The regime must hold to that, while the GD regime probably has more of a free hand, more space to maneuver, because it’s attached to Russia at the moment. It doesn’t really have to care as much about Western opinion. It’s the Belarus scenario: also attached to Russia.
Let me ask you something that in Georgia nobody can answer yet, but maybe you can for Serbia: how far is the regime willing to go to hold the line? And how real is the fear at the top that if they give up, they’ll face the same treatment they’re giving the opposition now?
Dissent in Serbia is very high, and the people are really, really angry. There is a desire for revenge when the regime falls, for these people to be prosecuted.
We didn’t see that strongly enough after 2000. Back then, some transitional deals were made with parts of the Milosevic regime. But this time, we don’t see a desire for deals. That’s one of the key points: this protest movement doesn’t want to cooperate with the opposition, doesn’t trust them enough, thinks maybe they are also controlled by Vučić. There’s huge suspicion of the Vučić regime, and they don’t want a deal, not like 2000 when Milosevic fell. They really want to deconstruct this regime as much as possible.
But Vučić is buying time. The strategy is to wait this dissent out, hope the protest fizzles. The next regular elections aren’t due until 2027. That’s about a year and a half. So the regime thinks that’s their best shot — the long game.
Do you see any light at the end of this tunnel — for either Serbia or Georgia? And what does it depend on?
Well, I see that this protest movement in Serbia is really broad, socially. It connects a lot of people — from the capital, from the provinces, different layers of society, different ideologies. It’s really a mass movement. I haven’t seen anything like it since 2000. I think it will ultimately succeed. I can’t say exactly when, this year or next, but this dissent isn’t going away, and I don’t think the regime has any instrument to raise its own popularity. It’s not winning any contest — not economic, not political, not geopolitical. It can’t find any big “victory” to sell to society.
So I think we are moving towards a kind of liberation of Serbia, slowly or more rapidly — I can’t say exactly when. The protests are very intense, but I can’t name a date.
And for Georgia?
I’m more pessimistic, simply because Georgia is so connected to Russia — economically it now depends mostly on Russia, especially with this sanctions circumvention. Obviously, people in the regime are making money from that.
If Georgia were geographically positioned differently, I’d believe the same for Georgia as I do for Serbia. But Georgia will have a better chance only if Russia is somehow defeated — maybe in Ukraine. Or maybe sanctioned harder by the EU and the US. If Russia weakens, Georgia has a better chance to set itself free.
Header image: Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić
