In an interview with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty’s Georgian Service, historian and analyst Arash Azizi argues that the current war is less about territory or nuclear capability than the survival of the Islamic Republic itself. While all sides can claim some version of “victory,” none can clearly define it and that ambiguity is prolonging the conflict. Azizi explains why Tehran may not be ready for peace, how internal power dynamics are shifting toward the Revolutionary Guards, and why even an end to the fighting could mark only a pause before the next, potentially more volatile phase.
Where do we stand now? And if today were a window, can we glimpse the end of this war anywhere, looking out of it?
There have been offers of mediation from the United States which the Iranians have not been accepting. It appears that Iran is very worried about the end of the war at the moment. That is another way of saying Iran would like to keep it going for a little while longer, because it feels it has been able to keep its leadership structure intact, it has been able to survive, and it has been able to project some power. If the guns were to fall silent now, it would have to face the music at home. It would have to deal with many problems and would probably not have long before it faced attacks again.
So Iran might not be immediately amenable to ending the war. At the same time, it correctly estimates that President Trump is unhappy with high oil prices, the continued survival of the regime, and the appointment of a leader Trump had said should not be appointed. All of this has affected his morale and has weakened public support in the United States for the war, on which Iran had certainly been counting.
Nevertheless, Iran has been significantly degraded in its military capabilities, but it has been able to survive.
In terms of when the war might end, it is possible that it could finish within the next couple of weeks. Trump would need to be able to declare victory, but at the same time it is becoming harder and harder to define victory in clear terms.
But the Iranians would also need to declare victory. Let’s define victory for each of the three sides involved.
The Iranians can easily declare victory now. They can say we survived. They could not force us to change our leader. We fought on. For Iran, victory is survival. This is not a war about Iran’s nuclear program and it is not a war about its military capability. It was a war about the Islamic Republic itself.
The United States and Israel wavered on that question when it became clear they could not get rid of the Islamic Republic as easily as they had claimed. So if Iran says we survived, we put a new leader in place and we are still in power, then the survival of the regime as an intact structure is very much a win for them.
For the US and Israel, the higher grade of victory would have been to remove the Islamic Republic or fundamentally change the tone of its leadership. Trump spoke about a Venezuelan-style transition as his goal, where Khamenei would be dead and someone like Delcy Rodriguez would be running the country, saying things like: “Mr President, we will work with you, we are happy to work with you, we have learned our lesson, we surrender.”
He’s obviously not getting that. Short of that, he can claim the degradation of Iran’s capabilities as a victory. He can say we hit their navy, we destroyed infrastructure, we killed this many people, we demonstrated that we are one click away from shutting down their electricity system. He will try to frame that as victory.
The Israelis care more about achieving their goals. They had a declared goal of bringing the regime down. They appear to have banked on a popular uprising scenario, which seems very short-sighted to me, because most Iran experts believed that was impossible. I do not think it will be easy even after the war.
Short of bringing the regime down, Israel can say that the Iran of 2026 is much weaker than the Iran of a few years ago. Netanyahu can justifiably say: think where Iran was on October 7, 2023, and think where it is now.
But the temptation of getting rid of the Islamic Republic will not disappear for the Israelis. They might resort to covert or armed actions inside Iran, trying to create internal strife or civil war-like conditions. So even if the war ends now, it will not be conclusive. It will essentially be a pause before the next round.
I think Trump would be ready to call it quits already. Israel might also be ready to stop. Iran will need to find a point where it can show that it lasted longer than the other two and that it is not weak. The weaker it actually is, the harder it will try to appear strong and show that it is in control. When you are weak, you often need to do more to demonstrate strength.
You dedicated a piece to Mojtaba in The Atlantic, dubbing him the “Nepo-tollah.” To continue with the metaphors, how heavy is the turban the new Supreme Leader is wearing?
Mojtaba is someone who has almost never been seen in public. In many ways he is a complete closed book. What we know about him mainly concerns his ties to the security forces. Many victims of the regime’s repression have claimed that he played a role behind the scenes.
He also appears to be incapacitated in some way, and we have yet to see a video confirming that he is alive and functioning. His first message to Iranians used very dour language. It offered nothing new, no new vision and no suggestion of a better future. It was the same familiar rhetoric about death to Israel and war with America.
In any case, real power does not rest with him. Real power rests with the Revolutionary Guards. This is not the era of Mojtaba. It is the era of the IRGC in Iranian politics.
Possible motives behind his appointment are threefold: it signals continuity, defies the United States by sidelining Trump, and suggests he may be controlled by those who installed him.
Yes. The third point you make is reinforced by the fact that Mojtaba appears to be incapacitated at the moment. Whether that is temporary or permanent remains to be seen.
The idea that Mojtaba could serve as a stand-in leader for the Revolutionary Guards is not new. On the day President Raisi’s helicopter crashed, I spoke with someone close to Qalibaf who almost hinted at this. He almost sounded pleased that Raisi was gone, suggesting that now Mojtaba could become Supreme Leader. People close to Qalibaf have long promoted Mojtaba as a possible successor.
History has more than enough examples where a would-be puppet placed at the top refuses to play the role. Could this happen here as well?
Sure, that can happen too. The puppet can become the puppeteer. But if the puppet is in a coma, it becomes quite a bit harder to do so. Mojtaba has played a role behind the scenes for years, so he is politically savvy enough to have been a major player within the regime. But everything we know about him comes from second- or third-hand sources. Some claim he is more radical than his father, while others try to portray him as a reformer. They say he could be the Mohammed bin Salman of Iran.
So we really do not know much about Mojtaba. That is the truth. We do not know what kind of leader he is going to be.
In his first message to the population, he called on Iran’s neighbors to get rid of American bases. What kind of neighborly relations is the regime counting on once this war ends, however it ends?
This is a key question. I think it is one that has divided the internal and factional politics of the regime. The regime invested a great deal in repairing its regional relations. A few years ago Saudi Arabia had cut diplomatic relations with Iran, and several other Arab countries followed suit. Egypt, of course, has had no diplomatic relations since 1979, although there have been limited forms of contact.
So repairing these ties became almost a priority for the regime. It was a priority under Rouhani, it was a priority under Raisi, and it remained a priority under Pezeshkian. It mattered a great deal. And of course, with China’s mediation in 2023, Iran restored diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia.
Now there is a debate within Iran. Should the regime continue repairing these ties and preserving them? Or should it say these are illegitimate monarchies anyway and we should pressure them, even intimidate them? Who are they to host American bases?
This thinking goes back to 1979, the idea that these monarchies are illegitimate. Bahrain has a Sunni monarchy ruling over a Shia majority. Saudi Arabia is a monarchy governing Islam’s holy sites and a significant Shia minority. The UAE is another monarchy, now closely aligned with Israel.
We can already see this debate producing factional tensions. Pezeshkian, for example, issued what sounded like an apology to neighboring states. He then had to walk it back because many within the regime reacted very negatively.
So this is one of the central questions facing the regime. How will it structure its relations with its neighbors after the war? But it is also a major question for those neighbors. They increasingly see themselves caught between Israel and Iran, two powerful non-Arab states that attack or pressure them and operate in their neighborhood. They feel stuck between two belligerent powers.
Let’s talk about the Strait of Hormuz, one of Iran’s key asymmetric levers. How effectively, and for how long, can Tehran realistically sustain that pressure?
There are limits to it. The real trump card would be if Iran mined the Strait of Hormuz, which would create far greater difficulties for the Americans. But mining the strait would not be easy for Iran, and it would not be easy for the Americans to counter it either. It would be difficult for both sides.
Iran will face limits in how much it can close the strait. But remember that it does not actually need to shut it completely. All it needs to do is make the situation frightening enough that ships are unwilling to pass through.
Iran knows the kind of havoc that would cause. It knows the pressure it would place on the United States, on the region, on Europe, and on the global economy. You can already see that the United States has allowed Russia to sell more oil as a result.
So the Iranian regime can probably use this leverage for quite some time.
The US and Israel appear focused on eliminating Iran’s missile and drone launch capacity, and launch rates have already declined significantly. While this suggests a weakening ability to respond, the question remains: can Iran be fully neutralized?
Iran still retains considerable capabilities. It is conserving its missile arsenal. It still retains significant drone capabilities.
Iran could continue fighting for weeks, possibly even months. At the current pace, if operations continue as they have, it would take months rather than weeks. Not six months perhaps, but at least another three months. That would be enormously costly for the United States and Israel in every sense.
What might post-war Iran look like?
Iran will face major challenges. If the war stops, it will have to manage a devastated economy. It will have to rebuild its military capabilities. It may even struggle to pay civil servants.
Until now the economy, while very weak, has at least managed to provide basic goods. That could become much harder. There may be real logistical problems.
Iran will also face a very different regional environment. Its neighbors will view it as a rogue power under new leadership that appears unpredictable and ready to use force.
So Iran will face many challenges, but at the same time it will also begin to rearm.
Could it also face more civil unrest from those who hoped this war might create an opportunity to challenge the regime and force genuine change?
You cannot predict civil disobedience and you cannot predict civil uprisings.
Could there be a massive wave of protests where millions come out and bring the regime down? It is not impossible. But it is not likely.
I think many opponents of the regime will feel demoralized. They will see that there is no easy way to defeat the regime. Part of the Iranian opposition initially welcomed the removal of Khamenei but they quickly realized that this war was not going to help them. And they still lack inspiring, galvanizing, strategic, inclusive and charismatic leadership capable of organizing a revolutionary movement against it.
What about those who place their hopes in the Shah?
Reza Pahlavi’s camp appears to want this war to continue much longer. They would like Trump and Israel to prolong it for several more months. They seem to hope that this could eliminate much of the regime’s leadership and produce something closer to total war conditions.
In their imagination there is almost a final day, a day of reckoning. Pahlavi keeps saying, wait for my final command. In fact he has asked people not to go out into the streets yet. They seem to believe that a moment will come when the regime is so weakened that they will call for one final uprising.
In that scenario, Iranians would come out, seize weapons and overthrow the regime. It almost has a messianic tone to it. But I don’t see it happening.
On the nuclear question, how tempted is Iran to go all the way? Ali Larijani once likened giving up its program to trading “a pearl for a candy bar.” Has that calculus shifted?
It may very well be the case that the current leadership of the Islamic Republic will conclude that they are no longer bound by the so-called nuclear fatwa of Ayatollah Khamenei, and that under new leadership they could develop nuclear weapons. They might well conclude that this is the only way to ensure such attacks will not happen again in the future and therefore decide to pursue it.
The problem is that even if they attempt it, I do not think they will be able to do it that easily. Intelligence penetration remains very deep. If they decide tomorrow to build a nuclear weapon and someone discovers it, the next day there will likely be new attacks. Israel and the United States will stop at nothing to prevent that from happening.
As a historian, what place do you think this war will occupy in Iran’s history? And what will be its legacy?
This is clearly a turning point in Iranian history. The age of Khamenei came to an end not with a whimper but with a blast. He was killed dramatically in this war by the United States and Israel. The transition we had anticipated for many years finally happened. Power has nominally passed to his son, but in reality the Revolutionary Guards now hold power. I also think that Ali Khamenei will not be judged kindly by history. He will likely be seen as someone whose stubbornness, his rigid insistence on certain policies ultimately led Iran into this war and brought the country to the point where there is now, effectively, an ideological civil war within the population. Hopefully it does not become a real civil war, although that possibility still exists.
My own prognosis about the historical moment we are in is that we will first see a period of interregnum. At first it will look as though everything continues as it did during the Khamenei era. It will appear as if nothing has changed. And then the sharper changes will come later.
Now that Khamenei’s ideological revolutionary leadership is gone, the figures who remain do not seem ideological in quite the same way. Because of that, I think Iran could look very different in a few years’ time. Exactly how different, and in what direction, remains to be seen.
Interview by Vazha Tavberidze
