In addition to the so-called ‘doctrinal’ issues, the personality of Donald Trump himself is no less important to consider. He is a politician and businessman who seeks to change reality and expand the boundaries of possibilities as much as possible.
Working with him and his team requires a special sensitiveness, because compared to Biden or other presidents of the recent past, Trump always emphasizes his ‘difference’. Therefore, this ‘difference’ also requires a ‘difference’ in form and content in Georgia’s dealings with him.
We must also remind ourselves that when dealing with the centers of power in the United States, it is important to strike the right balance between the Republican and Democratic parties: while seeking Republican support, we must not intentionally or unintentionally displease the Democrats.
And now about the most difficult and sensitive: what are the areas of overlap or issues where Georgia’s interests could find a place on the Trump administration’s agenda? By integrating into the matrix of US stated objectives, where can we keep US aid and support for us? To what extent are such regional initiatives identifiable that would facilitate stronger Georgia-US ties?
Simply put, how possible is it for Georgia to sign a ‘contract’ with the Trump administration on renewed Georgian-American co-operation?
In my opinion, some of the areas of such a practical and mutually beneficial intersection are:
1. In the context of one of the fundamental principles of the ‘America First’ policy – ‘Greatness of America’ – the topic of the successful Georgian state as a result of years of American support remains relevant. In this regard, it is essential that we and our American partners clearly understand that the success of the ‘Georgian case’ is, among other things, equivalent to contributing to the reputation and authority of the United States not only in Georgia, but also beyond its borders.
2. Against the backdrop of the recent rise of anti-American sentiment in our neighbourhood and the wider region, a shared concern of Tbilisi and Washington is the appropriate impact on countries in the region via succeeding in the war of disinformation within our country, as well as, if not completely eliminating, then significantly reducing the detrimental impact on Western interests on a regional scale.
3. The better expansion of American interests in the Black Sea area, which is directly related to Georgia’s national security system. The guiding principle here is as follows: the US is not a Black Sea country, but should become a Black Sea power. The institutionalisation of US geopolitical and other representation in the waters of the Black Sea – including with the active involvement of Georgia – also leads to the projection of US interests onto the adjacent geographical areas of the Black Sea region.
4. It is possible for the practical aspects of Georgian-American relations to intersect in the following geopolitical and geo-economic axis: Black Sea – South Caucasus – Central Asia. The “Georgian bridgehead“ is likely to fit seamlessly into the projection of US interests along this line. In this case, the passive geographical position of Georgia becomes an asset if we consider the country as an additional channel with ‘exit’ to Central Asia. Accordingly, our historically proven role as a ‘locking’ country for a number of cross-border projects (Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzrum, etc.) will be filled by new projects (e.g., the Middle Corridor).
5. Given its policy towards Russia – which will largely be determined by the new US administration’s attitude towards the Russian-Ukrainian war – Georgia could take on the role of participating in containing Russian influence in the South Caucasus segment of the Greater Black Sea region. Naturally, such involvement will be commensurate with our own resources. This also requires two necessary caveats: first, the US itself will be determined to act as a driving force in this process, and second, the US side will ensure the resilience of the Georgian side in a very effective way, utilising all relevant resources
6. The topic of China, which is extremely sensitive for all major global players, not to mention smaller countries. Several critical circumstances in the US-China-Georgia triangle must be taken into account.
One of the most important questions is how the relationship between Trump’s America and China will evolve. Despite their strategic rivalry, the interdependence and interconnectedness of these two major economies is widely known. In addition to systemic and macro-level issues, specific business interests of business circles close to Trump in China are also known. Therefore, I do not exclude that with the transition from the policy of so-called ‘decoupling’ to the policy of ‘de-risking’, the relations between the US and China will subsequently be quite ‘situational’ and will be characterized by a certain zigzag unevenness based on the principle of so-called ups and downs. Suffice it to say that instead of Trump’s statement during his election campaign about imposing tariffs on all Chinese goods, after his election as president a relatively milder option is being considered – raising tariffs only on goods of certain nomenclatures.
As far as Georgia is concerned, the reader is well aware of the recent dynamics of Georgian-Chinese relations. Therefore, I think there is no point in describing them and highlighting their individual aspects. It is also a fact that smooth and clear co-operation with China, as a globally significant player and leading economy, is one of Georgia’s national priorities. However, even in this respect Georgian policy needs to find the right balance that will not overshadow the Western strategic vector and will not raise uncomfortable questions, of which there are plenty today. Along with appropriate safeguard mechanisms, I would name the rapid and steady integration of Georgia into the Western system, which would contribute to the economic and political stability of the country and prevent the distortion or appropriation of the Georgian main line under the pretext of non-transparent ‘commercial transactions’. Among other things, it is the responsibility of our country as a member of Western political civilisation to oppose revisionist policies and to work together with the United States and other Western partners to create an effective counterweight in the wider Black Sea region.
7. Here I will briefly discuss two specific issues in the context of the South Caucasus – as a link between the Black Sea and Central Asia. I will start with the Ankara-Baku-Tbilisi cooperation, within the framework of which various interactions between the three neighboring countries are taking place, including in the military cooperation format. Obviously, Turkey’s role in the region and beyond is very important to the United States, and a direct channel of communication has been established between the two countries. This channel is likely to become more meaningful given the personal contacts between Trump and Erdogan. The alliance between Turkey and Azerbaijan should also be mentioned, which is notable in regional affairs. Given all of this, it is worth considering the extent to which Tbilisi can amplify Washington’s voice and facilitate ‘message box’ communication by utilizing the Georgian side’s special relationship with the Turkish and Azerbaijan sides.
The next issue is US-Armenian relations, which have moved to a new stage as a result of the new charter of strategic partnership, and the role Georgia can play in further rapprochement between the US and Armenia. It should be particularly noted that by signing the above-mentioned charter, the US once again expressed its interest in the South Caucasus. It is also a fact that the US-Armenia Strategic Partnership Charter will be realized much more fully if the Georgian side promotes American interests in the region. Nor can it be denied that the western vector of the region’s development largely depends on foreign policy coordination between Georgia and Armenia. Armenia’s American/Western vector responds to Georgia’s strategic interests, while Georgia’s American/Western vector is crucial to Armenia’s strategic interests.
So, we need to remind ourselves…
That in today’s world we are not required to subject Georgian politics to strict moralistic criteria. It would be much better if the effectiveness of a country’s politics is determined by the relevance of specific actions in a particular context (in this respect, for example, Israel of the 1950s and 1960s offers ‘best practice’). And another (controversial) consideration: it is not always possible to find the right and consistent balance between modernization of one’s own system on the one hand and democracy on the other. Rational prioritization is also key here.
In conclusion, let us quote the words of the well-known Georgian diplomat Alexander Chikvaidze: “A small country cannot afford the luxury of making big mistakes.” Indeed, this very simple statement contains both profound content and an urgent appeal in terms of shaping Georgian policy.
Op-Ed by Victor Kipiani, Chairman, Geocase
