The harmful challenges to our security have not decreased, but rather increased in number. This is both unfavorable and, in some cases, downright embarrassing. Of these, the first and foremost is the degradation of Georgian state institutions and, alongside this, the neutralization of Georgian state and political thinking: not only is the activity and initiative of decision makers no longer encouraged, but being in the line of decision makers itself has become risky. Another case is when, during a conversation about security, you reproach your opponent with the exclamation “Do you want a war?” Here, too, the existing situation has equated contemporary Georgian security policy – save for some enthusiasts and specialists in this field – with inaction, immobility and tolerance under the guise of “peace policy”. And this is when the processes around us dictate the exact opposite attitude.
The current election campaign negatively affects the national political discourse, leading to a paralysis of critical thought on pressing security issues. In response, fostering a vibrant, professional discussion within academic and analytical circles has become essential for uniting opinions and maintaining dynamic thinking. This effort aims to integrate thoughtful discourse into Georgian state policy over time. Until then, the intention is to provide readers with traditional or experimental insights for public discussion.
The security dilemma: balancing on the edge of “war or peace”?
“Security dilemma” is one of the particularly amorphous concepts in international relations. Academia has been trying to define the boundaries of its range since the 1950s, although these numerous attempts have not done much to shake the amorphous nature of the “security dilemma.”
The essence of the mentioned concept, transferred to our case, is simply formulated as follows: how clear and bold Georgia should be in declaring and implementing its security doctrine in order to achieve the two goals equally: in particular, in order to effectively strengthen its own defense capabilities, on the one hand, and on the other hand, by such strengthening, not to inadvertently upset the regional balance and not to give neighbors such an impression of its real intentions as to cause escalation.
In more detail, the proposed understanding of the “security dilemma” has a number of critical components, including maintaining the desired balance between military capabilities for defense and attack, avoiding the role of “proxy” in an era of renewed great power competition, etc. These and other sub-questions require competent and continuous discussion by specialists and decision-makers.
In the context of this publication, we decided to link the above-mentioned dilemma with the metaphor “war or peace” well known to Georgian society. However, if approached with a healthy, non-speculative attitude, the “security dilemma” will remain a central concern for Georgia’s security system and any future political force for the foreseeable future.
Regional mystery
The Black Sea region and the South Caucasus, as its natural extension, has become an obvious field of competition between global and regional actors. Had it not been for the war in Ukraine, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, the hot phase of the conflict in the East and a number of other factors that weighed down Georgia and its neighbors with conflicting geopolitical interests, this would have been hard to imagine just a decade ago.
In this small region, various influences—cultural, economic, military, and diplomatic—are converging, leading to efforts to establish a new balance of power in the South Caucasus. Currently, the area is in a “geopolitical fog,” which could clear under several scenarios. While many topics are relevant, this article will focus specifically on key issues concerning Georgia’s security.
Black Sea potential
The processes taking place in the wider Black Sea region are unique in that various opportunities are increasing along with the growth of threats. In fact, it so happened that if it were not for the crises known to readers, the models of practical security policy the discussion of which is already possible today, would have remained merely theorical.
One of the possible models is the creation of a systemic and institutionally organized Black Sea security alliance of the Black Sea countries (obviously, with the exception of the Russian Federation) – “mini-NATO on the Black Sea”.
In today’s security landscape, mini-alliances, or minilateralism, are emerging as effective means of ensuring stability and deterrence through collaboration among geographically close countries to address common threats. This approach has been tested in the Indian and Pacific regions and could similarly benefit the Black Sea area. A Black Sea mini-alliance would represent a rethinking of traditional security concepts and could serve as a complementary mechanism to larger alliances like NATO. Additionally, this alliance could extend its focus beyond military defense, as seen in discussions around initiatives like the Black Sea Declaration.
It is also worth considering turning a systematic approach into another impetus for the development of the Georgian military and industrial complex, as well as the creation of the defense and economic (including advanced technologies) infrastructure necessary for the functioning of the aforementioned alliance.
Such an alliance in the Black Sea region has solid preconditions formed in the last decades, which envisaged and still envisage today regional formats of cooperation. In this respect, the contribution of various Georgian authorities, and in some cases even a proactive stance, should be noted. Today, along with the restoration of Georgian proactivity and on the wave of processes taking place in the vicinity of our country, the Black Sea region requires a transition to a new level of cooperation – institutionally more integrated security.
Despite the political and geopolitical diversity of the region, the Black Sea mini-alliance is equally relevant and interesting. Why?
(a) Prior to the formation of a formalized bloc, regional association can be initiated in the form of a single network and with a gradual increase in such cooperation and integration;
(b) In addition to the multilateral or bilateral security and defense ties we have already mentioned, the proposed mini-alliance allows for the development of a system of horizontal linkages among the participating countries;
(c) I have mentioned diversity and with this in mind I think that the proposed format makes it possible for such countries to join it which on the foreign policy field follow the line of so-called “balancing”;
(d) Such model will be as de-ideologized as possible and the unity of member states will be based on a common understanding of the risks and threats in the region.
Regarding analogs, I mentioned the Indian and Pacific Ocean regions (e.g., QUAD or AUKUS), although Europe is not lagging behind this trend (“Ljubljana Triangle” consisting of Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine or coordination of five Nordic countries in the format of the Nordic Defense Cooperation). The emerging triad of Azerbaijan, Pakistan and Turkey also deserves attention. It is a fact that all examples are peculiar in their own way and have a “character” dictated by the geographical context. It is clear that from this point of view the Black Sea mini-alliance will differ only in its specific characteristics.
On the peculiarities of synchronization with partners
The strengths of the Georgian security model largely depend on the establishment of the Western geopolitical order in the region: the more “US and EU” in Georgia and its neighbors, the easier it will be to manage the repelling of malicious threats to our country. This is an axiom and therefore needs no further proof.
It is crucial to ensure that both Georgia and its partners strengthen the South Caucasus’s role within the broader Black Sea region. Achieving the understanding that Georgia’s security is essential for regional stability, and that regional security is key to overall development, should be a priority. Georgian state and political thought should broaden the focus of national security beyond just Georgian interests, highlighting Georgia’s functional importance in modern international relations to enhance its relevance to partners.
From this perspective, many individual issues come together for consideration. Next week, in Part 2, I will be focusing on a few of them.
Analysis by Victor Kipiani, Geocase Chairman
