Analysis by Victor Kipiani, Geocase Chairman
Only a short time has passed since the release of the initial version of the peace plan for ending the war in Ukraine. Yet even this brief period has encompassed its own share of drama and events: chaotic diplomacy, leaked phone conversations, personal sympathies and antipathies, and more.
But the most important thing this process vividly and unambiguously reveals is the nature of the modern international order – more precisely, the disorderly order – its new, highly uncomfortable character. A character that gives rise not only to justified concerns about today, but to entirely legitimate anxiety about tomorrow as well.
Much has been written about the revolutionary evolution of that very same disorderly order, and I too have, on many occasions, taken the liberty of speaking about it publicly.
Several deeply concerning features—this is still mildly put—characterize the picture that has emerged globally:
- Absolute security in the modern world is impossible, and promises of ensuring it are empty;
- Over recent decades, the persuasive force of international legal norms has sharply weakened;
- The authority of international law and, along with it, the authority of international organizations, has significantly eroded;
- The effectiveness of preventive political-legal mechanisms has clearly become dependent on the goodwill and willingness of the “powerful of this world”;
- In the balance of international relations, the nuclear component has lost its original restraining and stabilizing effect;
- The structure and nature of military conflict have changed—distinguishing between its passive and active phases has become pointless due to the complexity of the methods used;
- A widespread approach to achieving geopolitical advantage has become the so-called “salami aggression” (or gradual aggression)—the incremental building of political outcomes atop step-by-step military gains.
Once again, all of this has been made extremely visible by the war in Ukraine, and by the numerous attempts to bring it to an end: visible to Ukraine and visible to the world.
Among them, it has shown us – Georgians – a great deal. For us, the political and military outcome of this war (or even its freezing) has a direct and immediate impact, because this is not an ordinary war among wars. It is a system-forming war.
In other words, it is a war that will offer—geopolitically, economically, and militarily—new standards of a disorderly order: standards that in some cases may be acceptable, but I fear more often will be objectionable.
Since we are speaking about system-forming standards, I will briefly highlight several issues within Ukraine’s peace plan that are critical from a Georgian perspective—from the vantage point of a Georgian optic.
How do we want – or not want – them to be reflected in the final plan?
To what extent will this plan help or hinder us, later on, in negotiating with both adversaries and partners on Georgia’s national interests with the most optimal, the best possible content—what I often call “extracting value”?
And I do not call it that accidentally.
1.Ukraine’s peace plan must not allow territory to become the subject of a deal.
This is perhaps the most fundamental issue – not only for maintaining even minimal resemblance to a just order in an upside-down world, but also because it has critical importance for us, Georgia, as we conduct diplomatic warfare for our territorial integrity.
2. Ukraine’s Armed Forces must be maintained in a desirable, combat-ready condition.
Why is this so important for us, for Georgia?
Because Ukraine and Georgia share one fundamental feature: proximity to Russia. And as a result—one flank, one threat, and one response: unity in containing that threat.
Thus, in the future, keeping the Russian threat maximally tied down on the Ukrainian front, keeping Russia focused and drawn toward Ukraine, may help us not necessarily to neutralize—unlikely as that may be—but at least to weaken the threat directed toward Georgia.
In a fragile international security system, even that, you would agree, already counts for something.
3.Western money must be spent on Ukraine’s reconstruction.
This will create a precedent in the post-Soviet space for rebuilding and modernization—a kind of variation of a post-Soviet Marshall Plan. This precedent will stand before us, Georgia, when it comes to receiving real – not symbolic – material resources in the conditions of de-occupation and beyond.
And deservedly so: as a response to the blood and suffering that the citizens of this country, its society, have paid for their loyalty to the Western course.
Also deservedly and justly, because this resource must serve as a price – at least in some places and in certain respects – for the half-hearted policies connected to the West’s desire to remain within its “comfort zone,” a desire it simply could not abandon despite the high price paid by us.
Of course, there are many other issues to be noted when discussing Ukraine’s peace plan. But for now, I have singled out only these – singled them out through the prism of a Georgian ultra-realist political approach; singled them out as I believe necessary to mark and analyze them without sentiment or emotion – solely as it benefits us to see them, as it suits us to use them.
At the same time, I fully understand that implementing a Georgian ultra-realist policy in international relations requires something essential: a foundational, internal pillar—a normalized domestic setup and environment.
Yes, a normal, rational, adequate state structure and rhythm—not a country resembling a limited liability company, or worse, a cooperative.
Analysis by Victor Kipiani, Geocase Chairman
