“There cannot be friendship if there’s a hierarchy. Friends are equals. And there is a rapidly growing asymmetry in the relationship between China and Russia – and both sides know it.” – says Professor Sören Urbansky, historian at the Ruhr University Bochum. He is the co-author of Distant Neighbors: A Concise History of Sino-Russian Relations (in German, Suhrkamp, 2025), which traces the complex interactions between the two countries over four centuries.
In the interview with RFE/RL’s Georgian Service, Dr. Urbansky discusses why the “No Limits” partnership between Beijing and Moscow is built more on convenience than lasting trust. He highlights the growing asymmetry between the two countries, diverging interests in Ukraine, the Arctic, and Central Asia, and longstanding historical tensions, among other things, addressing what China’s increasing role means for Russia’s traditional sphere of influence – including Georgia.
Let’s begin with this marriage of convenience that China and Russia have going on – what foundations is it built on?
At the moment, there is a great deal of strategic interest overlap on both sides: they both see the United States as their main opponent. They both oppose the liberal post–World War order, seeing themselves as belonging more to an imperial model based on spheres of influence. They both have their Near Abroad, to use the Russian term: in the Chinese case, it’s Taiwan and the South China Sea; in the Russian case, Ukraine and the rest of the post-Soviet space. Economically, the relationship is mutually beneficial – Russia, since the full-scale invasion, is heavily dependent on China for nearly everything it can no longer get from the West, be it cars, dual-use goods, machinery, and so forth. Meanwhile, China profits from lower prices of raw materials and has more leverage in negotiations with Russia than ever before.
How strong is this bond? The much-vaunted “No Limits Partnership” between China and Russia – are there truly no limits in this partnership?
The short answer is no – this “No Limits” partnership has many limits. While both sides seek to portray the relationship as harmonious, it is especially Russia that emphasizes this narrative—despite underlying areas where friction is likely to emerge in the long run. One of the main ones, interestingly, is the eventual outcome of the Ukraine war – a conflict that serves China’s interests in several ways, not least by potentially prolonging the American military’s engagement in Europe beyond what Washington would prefer.. And while Russia wants the Americans out of Europe, China doesn’t.
The second significant point of difference would be the Arctic. China portrays itself as an Arctic neighbor. Now, if you look at the globe, there is scarce geographical evidence to support this claim. Meanwhile, Russia sees the Northeast Sea Passage as its exclusive sphere of influence, including all the raw materials there. In this context, Donald Trump’s desire to “buy” Greenland is revealing – it’s a move aimed not only against Russia but also against China.
Another area of potential discord is Central Asia. Since the end of the Soviet Union, there has been a kind of tacit understanding between China and Russia: China could invest economically in the region, while Russia would retain military control and clout. But now, China is not only the largest trading partner of all five Central Asian countries, it is also slowly expanding militarily. It’s starting with the weakest link in economic terms – Tajikistan – which, from the Chinese perspective, one of, if not the most crucial of the five, as it borders Afghanistan and is a direct neighbor of China. So you now have military or quasi-military bases built by China, officially staffed by Tajik soldiers – but there’s also a Chinese military and police presence there. China is testing the waters with Russia, in a way.
Then there are matters of historical legacies – or rather, claims that arise from them. While the entire debate about Taiwan in China is framed as the last piece of the jigsaw in completing the “One China” narrative, if you look at historical maps, and have a quiet chat with Chinese intellectuals, they will tell you: “Of course, Siberia – or the Russian Far East – was also taken from us by Russia, less than 200 years ago.” That’s far from ancient history. I’m not saying China will annex Siberia tomorrow. This will not happen – Russia is a nuclear power. But China will try to gain more influence in that region. If you look at past moments of cordial relations between China and Russia, they turned cold very quickly, and old historical rivalries resurfaced. So for now, both sides are playing nice – because it’s convenient and worth it. For now.
How long do you expect that “now” to last?
I think the big problem is the growing asymmetry in this relationship. There cannot be friendship if there’s a hierarchy. Friends are equals. And of course, on the surface – if you look at the TV coverage or the photos – it’s always presented as very equal. Putin always gets a red carpet in Beijing. But behind closed doors, there is a rapidly growing asymmetry in the relationship, which is keenly felt by Russian politicians, government officials, and so on.
So Russia, always bent on being the bigger brother to everyone, is turning into the younger brother.
Precisely. And it’s an open secret – everybody in Russia and in China understands who is the elder and who is the younger brother. Had Putin actually succeeded in Ukraine with his initial plans for a swift and decisive victory in Ukraine, his position toward China would have become stronger as well. But the exact opposite happened. Russia and Putin have become dependent on China, and this asymmetry is growing. China’s long-term plans – of becoming either the sole world power or at the very least having the U.S. as its only peer – don’t involve Russia as an equal. So they will have to find a new kind of arrangement and framework.
Speaking of the U.S. and the possibilities for new frameworks – what do you make of what’s been termed “Reverse Kissinger,” i.e., the Trump administration’s attempt to decouple China and Russia? Can it work?
No, it won’t. And I don’t think the historical parallel with Kissinger really works either. It’s just not a good comparison, for the simple reason that when Kissinger traveled to Beijing, China and the Soviet Union had already clashed – three years earlier. Right now, we have a very strong China-Russia relationship. So the timing isn’t right. I just don’t see, in the near future, a split between Beijing and Moscow that would allow Washington to drive a wedge between them.
It’s obvious that there is a strong personal relationship between the two leaders, Putin and Xi. But a great alliance between two great countries should be able to survive its leaders, right? Does their friendship extend to their nations? Do they view each other as friends, at least?
Well, great question. If we look back into the past – as any historian would – there were periods of similarly strong strategic interest overlap, but it didn’t necessarily lead to long-lasting kinship between the two nations. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, especially in shared border regions, there was a sizable Russian diaspora in China and a huge Chinese community in the Soviet Far East. So there were everyday encounters. But these were dismantled in the early 20th century, for various reasons, including Stalin’s forced deportations.
One very telling example of the lingering distance: China and Russia now share a border of 4,000 kilometers. Of that, 2,000 kilometers follow the Amur River. And yet, there are only two bridges across the Amur River. The Chinese offered to build more. The Russians said, “Thank you. Spasibo, ne nado.” So to this day, there are just two bridges. Even if both countries continue moving closer politically, there is still a long way to go before their peoples start holding hands. Especially with the growing asymmetry, the Chinese increasingly view Russia as a backward country.
What does China’s increased presence mean for Russia’s Near Abroad? And I don’t mean just Central Asia – here in Georgia, we’ve keenly felt China becoming more active, more prominent as well. Is it double the trouble or a chance to counterbalance the two great powers against each other?
A bit of both, I would say. In a way, that’s what Mongolia has done – or has had to do – for a long time. Mongolia was never part of the Soviet Union, but it was a Soviet satellite. Before that, it had been part of the Chinese Empire. Since its independence, it’s played a double game. It wants to maintain equally good relations with both countries and also include Western powers – Japan, Canada, the U.S. – especially in sectors like mining.
Has it been successful in this juggling act?
Well, it has been successful in the sense that, you know, neither Russia nor China has annexed it yet.
Is that a high bar to clear?
That’s the question, isn’t it? Such a high bar. But of course, the game in Central Asia and the Caucasus is different, since Russia – as you rightly pointed out – regards these countries as its historical sphere of influence, not just from Soviet times, but also from the Russian Imperial era. And yet we see that there has been no official reaction from Russia so far – which again demonstrates the extent of the asymmetry between the two sides. Russia has remained silent. How far China can go before Russia feels it has no choice but to speak out or react is hard to say. So in that sense, it creates unease in Moscow, but also opportunity in the capitals of those countries. To a certain degree – and with caution – one could try to play Moscow and Beijing against each other. So in a way, yes, it’s also an opportunity for these countries. But in the long term, it may prepare the ground for a new area of conflict between China and Russia.
*The book was published in German: China und Russland: Kurze Geschichte einer langen Beziehung
