After the killing of Iran’s leader Ali Khamenei by Israel and the subsequent selection of his son Mojtaba as the new supreme leader, the leaderships of the three South Caucasus countries, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, sent congratulatory messages to Tehran. In a message released by the Azerbaijani side, the country’s president said: “I hope that together we will make further efforts to develop interstate relations in a spirit of mutual respect and trust, in accordance with the interests of our peoples.”
The statement was particularly interesting given that it followed an escalation which took place on March 5 when drone strikes were allegedly carried out by the Iranian side against Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave. According to Azerbaijani sources, one of the drones struck the terminal area of Nakhchivan International Airport, another exploded near a nearby village and injured several residents, while a third unmanned aerial vehicle was intercepted and destroyed by Azerbaijani air defense systems.
In the aftermath of the incident, the Azerbaijani government adopted a number of precautionary measures. Authorities temporarily closed segments of the country’s airspace and imposed restrictions on cargo truck crossings along the Iranian border. At the same time, President Ilham Aliyev ordered the armed forces to prepare defensive and retaliatory options, while publicly emphasizing that Azerbaijan had not taken part in the broader regional military operations directed against Iran.
The escalation was particularly unexpected given the improvement in Azerbaijani-Iranian relations. Only shortly before the attacks, the Azerbaijani leadership had made a visit to the Iranian embassy in Baku to personally express condolences following the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.
Tensions did not end there. Two days later, on March 7, a group associated with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) issued a warning to Azerbaijan, stating that Baku could face further attacks unless it severed its strategic ties with Israel.
Though surprising, there is a certain logic behind Iran’s strikes on Nakhchivan. Tensions surrounding regional connectivity projects in the South Caucasus remain a persistent source of friction between Baku and Tehran. From the Iranian perspective, emerging transit initiatives along its northern frontier threaten to undermine Iran’s geopolitical and economic position in the South Caucasus. In this context, the location of the drone strikes is notable. The attacks targeted infrastructure near a site expected to play a key logistical role in the proposed Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP).
Promoted by former US President Donald Trump, TRIPP is envisioned as a transport corridor linking Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave, which lies beyond Armenia’s Syunik region. From there, the route would extend westward into Turkey. The corridor is intended to be an addition to an already existing web of trans-Eurasian connectivity routes connecting Central Asia with Europe.
More importantly, however, the project would bypass both Russia and Iran, and the latter has long argued that such a development poses significant strategic concerns. Iran has aspired to play a key transit role between Azerbaijan proper and Nakhchivan and is against Turkey’s effort to build an uninterrupted corridor dominated by Turkic-speaking countries. Against this backdrop, the drone attacks can also be interpreted as a signal of Iran’s willingness to challenge US efforts to wedge itself into the South Caucasus and, more specifically, the projects that Tehran perceives as threatening to its regional influence.
The northern frontier is of critical importance to Iran since this is where the country has sea and land links to Russia. The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) allows the Islamic Republic to connect to the Russian economy. Since the INSTC’s western branch runs via Azerbaijan, Iran is expected to maintain stable ties with Baku.
Iran’s military action in the South Caucasus would also cause a significant realignment in the region. Though Azerbaijan and Turkey have been strategic allies, especially since 2021 when the Shusha Declaration was signed, Baku has always been careful to heed Tehran’s interests as well. Should Azerbaijan come under military pressure, it would likely activate the mutual defense clause with Turkey.
Azerbaijan can also push for greater security ties with Israel should pressure from Iran rise. This could play out in tighter security and military cooperation. Another potential shift could be Baku’s greater emphasis on expanded security ties with the United States, especially given the already extensive nature of cooperation. This includes the TRIPP and the personal rapport between the presidents of the United States and Azerbaijan. Tensions with Iran will also push Baku to seek normalization of ties with Russia. Simultaneous coolness in ties with the two big countries, Russia and Iran, would put Azerbaijan in a tenuous position.
Yet Azerbaijan will choose a pragmatic approach, a policy rooted in the country’s ties with Iran and, indeed, another big neighbor, Russia. Since the second Nagorno-Karabakh war of 2020, when the balance of power irreversibly shifted in Azerbaijan’s favor, the country has gone through a series of political crises with Iran. Each time, diplomatic escalation has been followed by compromises and eventual normalization of bilateral relations. The pattern is likely to repeat this time as well, given that Azerbaijan strives to avoid being pulled into the Middle East conflict. The balancing game is indeed difficult to maintain. Azerbaijan is simultaneously a strategic partner to the United States, an ally to Turkey, and it maintains close relations with Israel.
Nevertheless, Baku and Tehran have chosen close communication over escalation and since March 5 have held several phone calls between the presidents and foreign ministers. Wider strategic interests remain strong. Over the past year, the two countries have taken visible steps to stabilize ties, which had deteriorated sharply after the deadly assault on the Azerbaijani embassy in Tehran in early 2023. Since then, both sides have gradually resumed political dialogue and economic cooperation. In 2025, their bilateral trade has expanded to approximately $650 million, and the countries are working on expanding infrastructure projects.
Nor will Iran gain from tensions with Armenia. Just before the war began, Yerevan announced that relations with Iran would soon be elevated to a strategic level upon the signing of a relevant document.
The two countries have been close since the end of the Soviet Union, with ties boosted as a result of the first Nagorno-Karabakh war. With its borders on the west (Turkey) and east (Azerbaijan) closed, Armenia’s narrow link to Iran has served as a lifeline for the country’s economy. Moreover, Iran has also strived to support its northern neighbor as a hedge against the alliance of the Turkic countries. Should Iran target Armenia’s southernmost territory, where the TRIPP is supposed to pass, this will impact relations with Yerevan and could go against the very notion the Islamic Republic was actively defending, maintaining the corridor to the South Caucasus through Armenia’s narrow Syunik province.
For Iran, the South Caucasus has never been a central foreign policy arena. The Middle East and even Pakistan and Afghanistan have largely consumed the Islamic Republic’s diplomatic and economic resources. Yet amid the war with the United States and Israel, deterioration of relations between Tehran and the Arab countries, the northern border, the South Caucasus, has grown in importance as a frontier which links Iran to its principal partner, Russia. Should the South Caucasus see a major military escalation similar to what the Arab states are going through, Iran’s isolation will grow, further complicating its economic situation. Pragmatism therefore dictates that Iran will likely abstain from complicating ties with Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Analysis by Emil Avdaliani
Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.
