I have spoken many times about the trends leading from the old order to the formation of a new order. At this stage, it is not only premature but is also quite difficult to speak decisively and convincingly about the content of this new order. The main reason for such difficulty is likely to be the over-commercialization of political objectives and the transformation of national interests into one of “trade nomenclature” to bargain or deal with each other.
It is therefore no coincidence that I call the transition phase from the old to the new the “disorderly order,” where strategic planning has become like strategizing, and the line between policy maker and developer has blurred.
On the brink of borderless ‘(dis)order’
The most serious characteristic of this “(dis)order” is precisely the attempt to relentlessly undermine the sound principles of the old order that formed the foundation of the international legal order. In this regard, first of all, the inviolability of the state border and the territorial integrity of the country were considered (note: in this part of the article I translate the verb into the past tense, thus trying to emphasize the urgency of the issue).
Today we can clearly see that the preoccupation with rewriting borders and manipulating territorial concessions has become an openly declared handwriting of virtually all actors of system-building in international relations. In addition, no actor, regardless of a particular country’s governance typology, shies away from utilizing this “new norm” of “dis-order” leading to a new global formation. Moreover, with the help of the created conjuncture, each powerful country (some by actions, some by words) is trying to achieve maximum results in strengthening its own spheres of geopolitical and geo-economic influence.
Although it is still too early to draw a final conclusion about the irreversibility of the global transactional political line with regard to territories and borders, the emergence or establishment of spheres of influence in a new format is already a quite practically and visibly activated process.
Footnote comment
Spheres of influence, as I have said, are basically the privilege of a strong and large country which, using military, economic or diplomatic tools, exerts pressure on a particular target country or countries, or their regional or other grouping, in order to achieve desired changes in the target’s foreign and domestic policies.
There are many academic definitions, monitoring indices, and supporting formulas in the field of geospatial influence. Despite this abundance, in simple language, such influence is expressed through the effective impact of coercion or/and suppression by the influencing country. Simply put, the influencer has all the skills and abilities to a) get the target to do what the influencer wants, and b) get the target to refuse to do what the influencer doesn’t want to happen.
From Yalta to “Yalta”?
The word “Yalta”, as a designation for the famous Yalta Conference of 1945, has become synonymous with spheres of influence among world powers and on a global scale. The Yalta Summit defined the order of things in the post-World War II world for decades to come. However, it must also be said here that the existence of spheres of influence is a concomitant phenomenon of human history, including the history of wars, and the Yalta Summit in February 1945 is rather an introduction to the spheres of influence of the modern era.
We’ve mentioned history, and with respect to the sphere of influence category, I’ll “rapidly” highlight its evolution. It has already been said that mankind has always shown a desire to dominate geographical space, although the doctrinal beginning of the sphere of influence can be called the Monroe Doctrine of the United States of America in 1823. According to this Doctrine, the Western Hemisphere was declared a special zone of US interests, in which interference by other countries – countries outside the hemisphere – was considered unacceptable.
The Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, at which the understanding of spheres of influence took on a broader scope, is considered another important step in the evolution. In particular, the task of the European states participating in the conference was to agree on curatorial zones, including on the African continent.
From a historical perspective, I obviously cannot avoid the period before World War I, as the geopolitical ‘cohabitation’ of the four major empires (Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman, Russian and German) that existed at that time was essentially based on their respective zones of influence over colonial nations.
We have already mentioned the Yalta Conference of 1945 and its significance in terms of the division of spheres of influence on a global scale. The division of that time has stood the test of time. Objectivity requires to say that the rules of the game established at Yalta, which led to the bipolarity of the world, saved humanity from the hot phase of confrontation between the USA and the USSR during the Cold War. However, the bipolarity of that time was not characterised by absolute stability either. The fact is that these two superpowers, through their own ‘proxy’ forces in the so-called ‘secondary geographies’, in a mode of covert or overt confrontation, continued to try to further redistribute what had been distributed. However, the deterrent factor of nuclear weapons and the so-called concept of ‘assured destruction’ saved the world from catastrophic consequences.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of the Cold War added a new, often highly controversial, dimension to the understanding of spheres of influence. In this regard, we will have to cite a few not-so-pleasant passages from the recent historical past.
It would seem that the collapse of the USSR should not have caused any ambiguity with regard to the former Soviet nations, especially where the national idea and the desire for new geopolitical ties were so pronounced.
This was partly the case, as the Central and Eastern European countries that were part of the Soviet-run Warsaw Pact of 1955 were almost immediately recognized for their foreign policy choices by the West. At the same time, the process of liberation from post-Soviet-Russian influence was (and remains) much more difficult in the case of the former Soviet Union republics.
For example, US President George H.W. Bush’s speech to the Ukrainian Rada on 1 August 1991, in which he warned Ukrainians of the threat of ‘suicidal nationalism’ (actually national independence), made the West’s policy towards the post-Soviet space quite ambiguous. Rather, the interpretation of this speech in its own favour successfully weaponised Russian propaganda in the context of declaring the ‘near abroad’ to be Russia’s ‘backyard’, the geography of its privileged interests. However, Bush later justified himself by saying that the purpose of his speech was to support Soviet leader Gorbachev and prevent violence within the Soviet Union. In part, from the perspective of the events of the time, this rationale should perhaps be taken into account. But in the big picture – in terms of further ‘justification’ of Russian expansionism towards its neighbours – what happened was what happened.
Anyway, since the problem of countries (primarily Georgia and Ukraine) that found themselves in a geopolitical and security vacuum was temporarily ‘shelved’, the discussion of spheres of influence in the post-Cold War years seems to have ceased. Moreover, there was an expectation that not only would there be a convergence of governance models in the greater European area, but that common and acceptable security systems would be established involving formerly rival countries. Furthermore, with the signing of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation in May 1997, the movement towards geopolitical cohabitation in a new regime if not towards convergence of geopolitical goals, was to begin.
Here too, such expectations have fallen victim to infantile politics. Several events, including the recognition of Kosovo’s independence, Russia’s now open aggression against Georgia in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea, have led to the reactivation of spheres of influence and the emergence of new dividing lines in geopolitical and military terms. A given was created that prepared the fertile ground for the ‘disorderly order’ that exists today.
The fact is that the ongoing war in Ukraine, triggered by renewed Russian aggression, and the associated chaotic political process herald an era of new ‘deals’, including at the expense of territories and borders. This perception is further exacerbated by the hybridization of democratic regimes against the backdrop of the activation of authoritarian regimes, their deinstitutionalization and demeritocratization, and the fetishization of the ‘strongman’ approach, which is also directly reflected in the ‘deal-making’ development of international politics.
Therefore, I do not consider the subtitle ‘From Yalta to Yalta’ to be superfluous. The attempt to dismantle the residual construct of the international order makes it quite realistic to tear down the load-bearing walls that maintain stability in the course of international relations – territorial integrity and inviolability of borders – through extremely tough ‘realpolitik’. And this is practically equivalent to a tectonic catastrophe on a global scale.
And more broadly…
…This tendency further emphasizes the unconditional factor of force on the part of the strong and the permissibility of ‘creation of justice’ or ‘righting wrong’ through power politics. Also, one of the consequences is the vulnerability of other compact (small) countries, such as Georgia. We believe that countries that find themselves along the line of division of spheres of influence or on the ‘wrong side’ of such a line are even more vulnerable.
The irresponsible manipulation of territories and borders is further exacerbated by the rapid decline of democracy worldwide. In practice, the difference between the old and new Yalta can be expressed in the substantial decline of the democratic world if not in its complete neutralization. This, I repeat, directly threatens not only the stability and predictability of international relations, but also the interests of medium-sized and compact (small) nations.
This explicit use of force and the creation of politics by ‘laying hands’ on spheres of influence, while ignoring the fundamental principles of international law, will revive the very unpleasant principle of Antique. In particular, according to this principle, the strong had the right to do whatever they wanted, while the weak were obliged to tolerate what they were obliged to tolerate. It is also worth noting that modern politics today is almost completely de-ideologized, and the leading line is the absolutization of profit-making. I would also like to point out that these principles of law – territorial integrity and inviolability of borders – have been mercilessly attacked from all sides, regardless of political order.
Anyway, this particular handwriting has become a kind of ‘emerging culture’ today. It is also a fact that, at this stage, such a ‘culture’ seems to have the prospect of further popularization, since it is fully in line with the subculture of ‘strongman,’ makes both diplomacy and the demand for intellectual politics redundant, and, by contributing to the creation of an ‘enemy image’ in the external arena, facilitates the illusion of seemingly solving internal problems of a country.
To be continued in next week’s GT.
Analysis by Victor Kipiani, Chairperson of Geocase
