Political and military expert Serhii Kuzan is Chairman of Ukrainian Security and Cooperation Center (USCC), having held the post of advisor to the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine (2022-2023), and advisor to the Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (2014). Radio Free Europe/RL’s Georgian Service sat down with him to talk through hopes for Ukraine as winter approaches and hopes for Georgia as the elections loom. We started our discussion with the loss of Vuhledar.
Vuhledar has fallen after more than two years. What impact is that going to have?
We need to understand that Vuhledar and its surroundings were very important for the Russians, but not so important for Ukraine. Vuhledar was a focal point of our interference in their logistics which connects the eastern regions of the Donetsk with the southern region. In the south, the railway system was fairly poor, quite undeveloped. The railways are the backbone of Russian logistics. That is, where Western logistics is motor transport, Russian logistics relys on railways. In the east, that is Donetsk, Luhansk and so on, the railway network is well developed. In the south, the Russians are creating new infrastructure. They really needed a railway from Donetsk to Volnovakha and on to Mariupol, as they could not use the existing railway. And now that they have taken Vuhledar, they will fine-tune and develop infrastructure that runs along the Sea of Azov, making it much easier for them to transfer their forces and equipment from the eastern front not just to the south, but even to Crimea. And in doing so they will not be in the range of our artillery. They have secured themselves.
As for Ukraine, with the loss of Vuhledar, we have removed ourselves from an encroachment; it was quite disadvantageous for us to stretch our logistics the way we were so as to keep control there. It was at a dominant height, which gave us a tactical advantage, but all around there are only plains, so the flanks caused us defense issues. Now, we’re levelling the front, we’re closing this distance and we’re pulling closer to our main fortifications to the west. It is more favorable and convenient for us to keep this smaller front line.
And yet, for months, you fiercely defended Vuhledar. Why didn’t you retreat sooner, if it was advantageous to do so?
The same question can be referred to Avdiivka. Avdiivka was surrounded on three sides for over a year, which is almost a complete encirclement. But we were able to hold this dominant height while we had sufficient ammunition; we were able to control the adjacent territory, to control not only the city itself, but also the surrounding area, and to fire on Russian logistics lines, the railway and highways. But we developed problems with ammunition, when the Senate spent seven months trying to agree on the aid package for Ukraine. We had to withdraw from Avdiivka. The situation with Vuhledar is similar. It had already ceased to exist, in principle, as a city with urban infrastructure last year, that is, it had been completely re-equipped as a fortress. And as long as Vuhledar fulfilled its role as a defensive outpost, as long as it was possible to destroy enemy forces from this height, and as long as the fortifications allowed us to defend, that was how long Vuhledar could function. In the ratio of Russian and Ukrainian losses, it was high enough to make a decision to continue defending it, until that defense became untenable.
Does the Avdiivka parallel extend further, in that, had the West delivered what you were asking in terms of military aid, and in time, then Vuhledar too might not have fallen?
Indeed. Only 20% to 30% of our requests are being satisfied by our Western partners. We have serious problems with ammunition, with equipment, with weapons. We admit we have shortages compared to the Russians, that we do not have parity with them on any indicator. That’s our problem. And it would seem that even though they have largely emptied their artillery depots, still they outnumber us 6-8 times just in terms of intensity of fire. So yes, this is a serious problem. And, unfortunately, it is still far from being solved.
We can somehow deal with their artillery, and go toe to toe; we destroy their artillery installations, we destroy their armored vehicles, their tanks, but we really have problems against aviation. We can’t do anything about it. And if you look at the Russian footage of the bombardment of Vuhledar, they dropped large aviation bombs from the south, from the east, and they literally destroyed our positions. Of course, it is a big problem to hold positions in such conditions, when every day they bombard us with air raids, so that we can’t even raise our heads.
Russia continues to use its meat grinder tactics. If neither side is ready to back down, what is more likely to happen first- that Russia will run out of soldiers, or that Ukraine will run out of cities?
Well, if we look at the figures, we see that the area occupied by the Russians in the summer offensive campaign is smaller in area than the area we occupied as a result of the Kursk operation.
To what extent can this parallel be applied, because unlike Ukrainian cities, in Kursk nobody actually defended Russian territory.
That’s because they have no reserves, and if we look at their losses, we see that last month they lost 40,000 men. That means we destroyed or took out of the battle over a thousand of their fighters a day. 1300-1400 are the typical numbers. So at that rate, of course, any army would be depleted.
Add to that the fact the Russians did not fulfil any of the objectives they set out for their summer offensive. In the spring, we talked about those incredible Russian reserves, how we expected those accumulated forces to charge us and overwhelm us and break through in summer. After Avdiivka, they planned to take Pokrovsk and head in the direction of Zaporizhzhya and Dnipro, to reach the administrative borders of the Donetsk region. They also planned to take Chasiv-Yyar, to approach and decimate the urban agglomeration of Sloviansk, Kramatorsk, Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka. If we look even higher up, to the north, they planned to go to the left bank of the Oskil River and take Kupiansk.
None of those tasks were fulfilled during the summer offensive campaign. None at all. They planned to take Chasiv-Yar at the beginning of summer, back in June. But they did not take it; they couldn’t reach the left bank of the Oskil and were unable to even approach Kupyansk. We expected fighting on the outskirts of Kupyansk, but they couldn’t get there. They haven’t even taken the entire Luhansk region. They have not approached Pokrovsk. They did not take Kurakhov in the south.
We see that their reserves are being depleted, and in order to implement this offensive campaign, if the same intensity of fighting is to be maintained, well, of course, it also depends on our reserves, but the Russians will have to mobilize an additional number of people.
Western media says there are big problems with the Ukrainian reserves – that those motivated to defend their homeland are already at the front, and the rest are being pushed through by force.
This is a standard problem for a war of this scale and intensity. In general, we need to realize that we essentially ran out of volunteers in 2022. That is, all the volunteers who wanted to go to the front, they went in ‘22. In 2023, there was no big wave of volunteers; in 2024 year even less so. Obviously, we had to mobilize. People receive their summons, and go and enlist. Since May, we have been carrying out a planned monthly mobilization. Those who were mobilized in June-July are now in September and October finishing their training and will head to the front.
We understand what we are going into winter with, and we are confident that we will not be left without fighters.
Another problem is equipping them all, and we have really big problems with this. This is already a question for our industry and our partners. The fact that we will fight throughout winter is not in the slightest doubt: we will continue, and we will definitely have enough men.
What do you think of Georgian Dream’s latest election campaign posters comparing Ukraine and Georgia, seeing them claiming that only they can offer Georgia peace?
It’s manipulation and Russian narratives, and the fact that the ruling party applies Russian narratives is deeply alarming. We’ve seen similar narratives here in Ukraine since 2016. We had our own rich guy, our own “agent of Russian interests,” Viktor Medvedchuk, who also talked about how we need peace at any cost. And they attempted to plant these seeds into the body of Ukraine, in the occupied regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, under the indirect control of Moscow, just so that there would be no war. But any such speculation is all in the interest of Russia. Russia wants to undermine the statehood of its neighbors, as it undermines it in Moldova with Transnistria, as it undermines it in Ukraine with the help of Donetsk and Luhansk. And how it is now trying to undermine statehood in Georgia by offering the occupied territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as bait. This is what weakens the state, because it gives Russia leverage.
I am sure that in Georgia they will follow the same scenario as in Ukraine: they will offer to return Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but only on the terms of some confederation and limitation of sovereignty of the state and so on- typical Russian conditions, typical tricks of the KGB. And those who carry these interests out, consciously or unconsciously, are carrying out the will of Moscow. Medvedchuk did not end well. All Russian agents will end up like Medvedchuk, or even worse.
We are sure, absolutely sure, that you cannot defeat the Russians only here in Donbas: they must be kicked out of Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia too. Both Georgia and Moldova must have full sovereignty. Only then can we talk about the security of our region as a whole.
Interview by Vazha Tavberidze
