The recent visit of the US Vice President to Baku and Yerevan once again painfully reminded us of our country’s marginalization. In this regard, there is little need to dwell at length on the domestic and foreign policy of the current government: we clearly feel and observe its results in Georgia’s faded international positioning. It is equally evident that these outcomes harm us not only in the present or the near future, but in a much longer-term perspective.
There is only one remedy: a change in political course, which, under the current ruling configuration, appears practically inconceivable. Therefore, the necessary precondition for such change would be a change of government itself. And even then, only if, after this change, Georgian politics falls into the hands of systematically thinking, politically mature, and adequately competent political forces.
Precisely those political forces which, with broad public consensus, will restore to Georgia the reputation, role, and functional purpose it so urgently needs.
Discussion of reputation, role, and functional purpose must begin with restoring Georgia’s status as a pillar state in the South Caucasus. Especially since such a status is not an end in itself, but rather the foundation for the modernization of Georgian statehood, its competitiveness, and its renewal.
Without it, in this new international “order” driven by undisguised egoism and transactionalism, our capacity as a state depends entirely on the external world’s need for us, and our need for the external world. Otherwise, becoming a modern state is impossible, while remaining merely a geographic conduit for others’ interests is guaranteed.
Georgia’s re-establishment as a pillar state in the South Caucasus (incidentally, this Russian-derived term itself is debatable, might Central Caucasus be more accurate?) appears to me as the direct outcome of thoughtful Georgian politics. Yes, I see one of our country’s main assets, a kind of identifying marker, in maximum awareness in domestic policymaking, and in the articulation of innovative initiatives in foreign policy.
Georgia’s “return” to the region, its firm anchoring in regional politics, means recognition of the country as a pan-regional intellectual hub, the acceptance of advanced ideas it initiates, and their realization with Georgia’s active participation.
This will not happen without fulfilling the most important demand of Georgian society and its electorate at this stage: a fundamental replacement of the political elite, followed by a radical transformation of governance style and political culture as a whole.
Thus, establishing Georgia as a geopolitical and correspondingly geo-economic actor lies in initiatives whose practical benefits extend beyond Georgia’s borders. Here, our primary focus must be our natural habitat: our immediate neighborhood and the South Caucasus region. As a result, achieving geostrategic status for the region, equally in the interests of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, lies in initiatives that consolidate a new South Caucasian geostrategic unity.
I deliberately use the word consolidating instead of integrative, since decades of confrontation have left wounds that have yet to heal. Genuine integration, understandably of an economic nature, will require not only firm political will, but also bold political decisions and leadership. This, however, is a subject for a separate, extensive discussion.
On Concrete Initiatives
In this article, which I deliberately framed as a “reminder card,” I will outline several initiatives that could form the system-shaping regional geopolitics of a new Georgia’s new governing elite and political thinking, becoming its thoughtful and proactive agenda.
1. Communications, Communications, and Once Again, Communications
Projects related to communications, whether railways, energy, digital, or other logistics-infrastructure, are not merely about regional economics. They are directly linked to political relations and geopolitical realignments in the region.
The extent and manner of participation in such communication projects affects not only the future configuration of the three South Caucasus states, but also the weight of major actors, the US, the European Union, Russia, China, and Turkey, in regional processes.
Accordingly, Georgia’s top priorities should be:
1. further strengthening its existing participation in concrete projects; and
2. connecting, in any possible form, to planned or future projects.
It should be noted that projects launched in the 1990s (the Baku–Supsa oil pipeline, the Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum pipeline, the South Caucasus gas pipeline) no longer fully meet the key requirement: enhancing Georgia’s functional role under contemporary conditions.
Moreover, the implementation of the Trump Route significantly intensifies competition for Georgia’s regional positioning and raises uncomfortable questions regarding its status as a pillar state.
According to EU research, full activation of the Trump Route would reduce transportation time by 25 percent compared to the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars route.
The evolving environment around us, beyond the urgent need for rapid and necessary changes in Georgia’s domestic life, demands an immediate response to growing regional competition. The daily tasks of a future government should include:
(a) rapid modernization of Georgia’s segment of the Middle Corridor, including not only land infrastructure but accelerated development of modern maritime infrastructure. The ports of Anaklia, Poti, Batumi, and the Kulevi marine terminal must be integrated into a single coherent concept. Reminder: The Middle Corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor, is a significant component of the Trans-European Transport Network. Advancing within the Middle Corridor thus directly equates to advancing Georgia’s relations with Europe on the one hand, and with participating countries on the other.
(b) studying and lobbying feasible options for connecting to the Trump Route. Here, too, Georgia can offer partners meaningful arguments regarding its “insurance” role. Ultimately, this would contribute to positioning the region as a unified geo-economic partner for the outside world, benefiting all three South Caucasus countries.
(c) consolidating domestic intellectual and professional resources focused on enhancing the country’s and region’s communication role, organizing them institutionally, and ensuring state funding. Establishing such a “think tank” would increase Georgia’s geo-regional importance, strengthen its reputational security, and define its unique contribution to regional prosperity and development.
(d) as a preliminary idea, I propose creating a dedicated, high-trust, high-mandate state structure responsible for communication projects. Based on public-private partnership principles and a “one-stop-shop” model, such a structure could operate far more effectively. Georgia has historical precedent for this in the 1990s projects via the Georgian International Oil Corporation and its president, Giorgi Chanturia.
2. Formation of a Unified South Caucasus Economic Space
This process has begun faster and more unexpectedly than many anticipated. Georgia’s task now is to catch up, support it, and, wherever possible, lead it.
Accordingly, a modern, reality-aligned Georgian government should initiate:
(a) a free trade agreement among all three South Caucasus countries.
Even initiating dialogue would send a powerful signal to neighbors and distant partners alike: that the South Caucasus is leaving its heavy past behind, has matured politically, and is becoming geopolitically ambitious.
Such a free trade area would not only support national economies and economic self-sufficiency of the populations, but also enhance the region’s competitiveness through coordinated external economic policy.
(b) creation of a South Caucasus banking institution.
This institution should serve to attract financial resources for regional development, not as a traditional commercial bank, but as a financial supporter of infrastructure, logistics, industrial, and other strategic projects. A useful model is the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, initially focused on Central and Eastern Europe. Similarly, a South Caucasus Reconstruction and Development Bank should fulfill this role for the region.
(c) a South Caucasian commercial legal entity.
Inspired by EU practice, a single corporate legal status would allow operation across all three countries without separate national registrations. A “South Caucasian corporate passport” would institutionalize the four fundamental freedoms:
• movement of goods,
• services,
• capital, and
• labor.
(d) a regional free economic zone model.
Beyond legislation, this is a concrete mechanism for business convergence, synergy, and joint product creation. Alongside economic benefits, it would be a powerful political step toward trust-building and regional stability.
3. Dialogue with the Outside World
This is where Georgia must reclaim its rightful place following political change, restoring its pillar-state status.
Joint positioning by South Caucasus countries can significantly strengthen dialogue with the EU, especially as the EU itself recognizes the strategic importance of the Black Sea region and connectivity to Turkey and Central Asia.
Concrete projects in transport, energy, and digital infrastructure would usher in a new qualitative phase of cooperation, transforming the region from a geopolitical object into a geopolitical subject.
Such cooperation requires reciprocal commitment. While Brussels long viewed the South Caucasus as peripheral, this perception is changing. However, concrete joint advocacy by Tbilisi, Yerevan, and Baku is essential.
In Conclusion
These initiatives produce a positive-sum effect:
1. none limits national sovereignty;
2. all enhance collective agency.
They enable:
• dismantling remnants of the Soviet past;
• overcoming distrust and rivalry;
• building confidence in coordinated action;
• bridging political differences through cooperation.
The transformation of the South Caucasus into a geo-economic and geopolitical actor rests on functional cooperation rooted in shared interests, not ethno-cultural lines.
Georgia First
In all initiatives, the guiding principle is Georgia’s national interest. The country must not only serve as a transit space, but shape regional agendas.
Given accelerating regional diversification, Georgia must act swiftly. Time does not wait, indeed, it works against us.
Georgia must keep pace with change, as soon as possible.
Analysis by Victor Kipiani, Geocase Chairman
