Amid the war in Ukraine, tensions around Nagorno-Karabakh, and the seemingly unusual stability in Georgian-Russian relations, the recent developments in Georgia’s separatist region of Abkhazia are often ignored. They are, however, critically important to understand the overall dynamics of Russia-Abkhazia relations and how Moscow’s stance on the separatist regions is evolving.
Russia seems to have achieved what it aspired to for more than a decade, since 2008 when it recognized the separatist Abkhazia as independent following the invasion of Georgia in August that year. Now, after nearly 14 years of resistance, Abkhazia is gradually inching toward allowing Russian citizens to buy into the local land and the existing infrastructure. The last vestiges of Abkhazia’s relative autonomy vis-à-vis Russia are quickly dissipating.
Moreover, there were reports on a likely handover of the dysfunctional Sokhumi airport to Russia. Details are largely unknown, but, overall, the story seem to be correct. There are reports too that Russia contests a small village on the border with Abkhazia, which is rich with natural resources.
Abkhazians are worried. The course of events runs against their hopes for independence. They need Russia but at the same time loath the over-dependence on Moscow. Increasingly, the Kremlin is becoming more unwilling to make financial concessions unless Sokhumi makes a critical modification to its stance on property and infrastructure sales, as well as other minor concessions which would synergizing Abkhazia’s law with the Russian one.
A careful read of statements on Abkhazia made by Russian officials reveal tensions between the two sides and Moscow’s discontent with how obstinate Sokhumi can be. There are also troubles when it comes to financing the separatist region. Moscow is unwilling to provide financial support as before. Western sanctions are biting at the Russian economy, which is set to diminish significantly over the course of the next year. Moreover, Russian officials are also unhappy with the way their money is being spent. Little has been done so far to alleviate Russian grievances. In fact, they only grow in number – Russian analysts and politicians demand Sokhumi improve the security conditions for Russian tourists, as well as pay special attention to those who wish to buy property in Abkhazia.
The concessions made to Russia are, as Abkhazian political opposition contends, part of the near-secret negotiations held between Moscow and Sokhumi in early 2022. The results were not surprising and were largely based on the 2021 46-point agreement between Sokhumi and Moscow to create a unified socio-economic space with Moscow. While pitched as a move to alleviate the territory’s economic troubles, the program marks a huge step toward eventual de-facto annexation of Georgia’s region by Russia.
Multiple new provisions feature in the new document which were absent in the 2014 military agreement. The new pact creates various provisions for the sale of local real estate, among them a stipulation on dual citizenship, allowing Russians to get Abkhaz passports. A whole range of laws will be introduced whereby Russian investors will be able to invest money into and buy majority shares in what still remains valuable in Abkhazia.
While this may end up giving a shot in the arm to a decrepit Abkhaz economy, the high level of harmonization with Russian laws lays the groundwork for a future merger with Russia. It is this dilemma between closer cooperation with Russia and deep fear of Russian intentions that will haunt the Abkhazian political class for the foreseeable future. Though officially the new “socio-economic” program does not involve a change in Abkhazia’s political status, Abkhaz elites fret they are heading down the path to eventual incorporation into Russia.
Criticism of the pact in Abkhazia forced the region’s leader Aslan Bzhania to forcefully deny that Abkhazia was losing any sovereignty. Instead, he emphasized the positive elements of the document, especially the re-opening of Sokhumi airport. Bzhania also cited Abkhazia’s chronic energy shortages and the acute need for Russian assistance as justification for the deal. Still, fears persist. After all, unlike South Ossetia, the other Russian-occupied region in Georgia, Abkhazia has never entertained the idea of merging with Russia. Bzhania also explained the need to make concessions to Russia because it is Moscow that is its security guarantor, and angering the Kremlin would only complicate the already tense situation.
Russia is playing a long game. Pressure on Abkhazia has been building up gradually since 2020. After the resignation of Moscow’s preferred client Raul Khajimba, Bzhania’s candidacy was regarded with suspicion by Kremlin officials. As a result, when he won, Bzhania had to make multiple visits to Moscow to kiss the ring, even as Russian funding continued to dry up amid the pandemic. The cost of resuming aid, it appears, was increasing economic harmonization and with the looming threat of eventual assimilation.
With Russian investments into the energy sector and land purchases, Abkhazia will slowly lose its last vestiges of de-facto independence. Abkhazia’s position is further complicated because of the war in Ukraine. With new separatist entities in eastern Ukraine recognized by Russia, there is now little hope that Western countries or others will be willing to recognize so many statelets at the same time. Ironically, Russia’s expansion of its separatist empire and the quest to build a new order in its neighborhood produced counter-results for Abkhazia and other separatist regions.
On an economic level, Abkhazia is far richer than South Ossetia, and it makes sense for Russia to seek some sort of larger influence over it. But beyond economy, there is a larger geopolitical picture which needs to be taken into account. Of all the separatist regions Russia exerts control over, Abkhazia is arguably the most strategically located. A passage from North to South Caucasus, the region is also famous for its harbors and military infrastructure. Control over it also gives Russia capabilities to check NATO/EU expansion into the region.
Emil Avdaliani is a professor at European University and the Director of Middle East Studies at the Georgian think-tank, Geocase.
Analysis by Emil Avdaliani
