William Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor of Government in the Dartmouth College Department of Government, was Editor-in-chief of Security Studies from 2008 to 2011. He is linked to the Neoclassical realism school and known for his work on American unipolarity. Radio Free Liberty/RL’s Georgian Service sat down with him to discuss the US’ approach to the world.
“We might be in for a more substantial change in America’s fundamental approach to pursuing its interests, namely its grand strategy, than we’ve seen in many, many decades, and I’ve not seen anything like that in my lifetime. I want to stress it’s potential. We really have a very hard time estimating what is likely to happen given US domestic politics. But I see more realistic potential for a shift than I’ve seen in a very long time,” he tells us.
Let’s start with President Biden’s legacy.
In foreign policy, we have some unresolved questions, the resolution of which will determine Biden’s historical place. But we can begin making a scorecard about President Biden’s foreign policy successes and failures, and his overall legacy. He assembled a highly competent national security team and pursued a fairly coherent strategy of sustaining the commitments to alliances and institutions that this administration thinks are necessary for US security, but began the careful trimming of what they understood to be some over-commitment by the United States. And you saw that in their completion of the disengagement from Afghanistan. They really did want to see a diminution of US engagement in the Middle East, but they failed to do that for reasons outside of their control. When Hamas attacked Israel in October 2023, this was the kind of event that administrations can’t control, and they had to react to it.
Regarding Europe, we saw a massive increase in America’s commitment to NATO, a serious effort to aid Ukraine in its defense from Russia’s assault, and managing that process competently with a theory. Now, you might disagree about their theory of the case. You might think that they were too concerned about escalation. You might think that they were too careful in the speed with which they enabled Ukraine to take advantage of different US weapon systems. We can have that debate, but they had a coherent approach to Ukraine, Russia’s war against Ukraine, and they put it in place with a high degree of competence.
If you look at Asia, we’ve seen a further strengthening of the US alliance with Asia, with Asian partners, South Korea in particular, and Japan. We’ve seen them manage the cross-strait issue with Taiwan with significant confidence. And we’ve seen them engineer a change to our approach to our economic relations with China, where we witnessed a fairly substantial effort to try to maintain general economic engagement with China, while at the same time constricting access to the very things that will hasten the pace of their challenge to the United States’ position. If we put all those things together, we see a coherent professional implementation of a slight course correction in fundamental US grant strategy.
We are looking at two possible, mutually exclusive Americas, depending on the election outcome. How different are the two Americas we might end up with?
I would have to place a question mark over whether everything hinges on the election. The reason being that the Republican Party is not unified on foreign policy. In some sense, this is obscured by the fact that the party is now in a campaign and is seeking to present a unified position against Biden and now Kamala Harris. But underneath that are different strains in Republican foreign policy, and it’s very difficult to predict which of these strains would emerge dominant if Donald Trump were to win in November.
There are three basic strains: There’s a continued, robust, Republican, Reagan-style foreign policy, which we’re all familiar with; there’s a strong rebalancing, which is to dramatically de-emphasize European security, force the Europeans to take more of the responsibility, and pivot the United States much more towards Asia and to a lesser degree the Middle East; and the third strain is a much firmer “America First” element, which demands an overall decrease in American engagement globally. If the third approach becomes dominant in the Trump Administration, then you will see that dramatic shift in American foreign policy.
Most people are treating the appointment of J.D. Vance as potential vice president as a move towards the direction of the second and third approach, away from the first.
What could it spell for the US’ standing in the world?
The US’ standing in the world is already, obviously, not what it was five, ten years ago. We have a clear situation in which many actors in the world, elites, governments, intelligence agencies, have assessed that the United States’ power position is declining.
It’s weaker than it has been since 2000. I would say both objectively but also subjectively. But many actors exaggerate the degree of the American decline. That includes Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, but also includes some Republicans who see the US’ position as far more stressed than it is.
Talk to us about this ‘age of scarcity’ that potential VP Vance is preaching, keeping in mind your recent essay, where you argued that the US does not have to choose between Taiwan and Ukraine.
I don’t think it does. Yes, you have to acknowledge that in certain areas, this war and this global crisis we’re now in have revealed weaknesses in the US and allied industrial base. We’ve been preparing for the last 25, 30 years for a very different kind of war than a long-drawn war of attrition between highly substantial modern militaries. And the degree to which Russia’s war against Ukraine is destroying gear is quite extraordinary, and people really hadn’t planned for it. So J.D. Vance is correct in the narrow sense that we do face a resource shortage in certain munitions that are needed by Ukraine. However, some experts will tell you that most of them, except in a few instances, are not the same as what is needed in East Asia and Taiwan.
The other thing to bear in mind is that we are already seeing the defense industrial base respond to this new demand and increased production in both European and US defense industrial facilities, such that this shortage he’s referring to can be overcome in time.
If the China pivot is inevitable, how wise is it to leave Russia not dealt with and as a menace to at least Eastern Europe?
It’s unwise. Even though the best military analysts estimate that, say you ended the war today, the Russian military is going to take 7 to 10 years to reconstitute itself after all the damage it received, that doesn’t necessarily mean that Russia is now reconciled to a European security order that we have created. Strong evidence suggests the Russian political establishment remains deeply dissatisfied with the European security architecture as it exists. And this is the architecture that we support; therefore, Russia will seek various means to try to undermine that order until it achieves a different kind of European security order, which would not be good for the US. Rapidly shifting away from Europe, leaving the Europeans the entire burden of the task of trying to help Ukraine defend itself, would be a mistake for US interests.
Would the much-talked about statement from former President Trump about ending the war in 24 hours be an example of the alternative version of statecraft?
There are other foreign policy voices associated with the Trump campaign that speak of a much more careful and responsible pivot or renewed pivot to Asia, a pivot away from Europe. However, J.D. Vance says he doesn’t care what happens to Ukraine, says he doesn’t believe it has any meaning for American interests. I disagree with that. And we have Trump arguing we’ll settle the war in 24 hours and we’ll do a deal with Putin. Both of those things are quite delusional, ill-founded. They are unlikely to lead to a good outcome for the US, let alone Ukraine.
Vance says, “if they care so much about Ukraine, why can’t they simply transfer some money out of their welfare states into their military and deal with it?” Russia, they think, is a completely manageable problem for Europe without the US. And what they say is the only way Europe will ever do this is if we seriously and credibly start pulling back.
I think it has to be a much more gradual process. The US should be playing some sort of benevolent paternalistic role in helping to foster a strategic autonomy. If it doesn’t do that, if it pulls out quickly, we will see contradictions among European states, coordination problems. In security matters, Europe is sovereign countries – Getting sovereign countries to cooperate on things like nuclear weapons, defense procurement, is really, really hard without a leading state. If the Americans are out of it, who’s the leading state? Is it going to be Germany? Is it going to be France? Is it going to be both? How does the UK fit in now that it’s out of the EU? Very difficult. So I think the US has to be incredibly committed to Europe.
Would that involve another reset with Russia? And if it does, why would this one work when all the previous ones failed?
I don’t see it. I mean, I think it’s possible that Trump himself or maybe people in the Trump foreign policy orbit think that a grand bargain with Putin is possible. Maybe that’s what they have in mind with this notion that somehow they will back away from Ukraine and create some sort of modus vivendi and rapprochement with Putin. I see very little chance that that would be successful. Very little chance. I think one of the things that I would forecast here is that we have heard from Moscow recently what their terms are to have a conversation about a ceasefire, not to mention a peace settlement. And to talk about a ceasefire requires Ukraine accepting, as legitimate, Russia’s annexation of the four oblasts in eastern Ukraine. I think once this becomes evident that this is their minimum position to even start talks, I have a hard time imagining even Trump would accept those terms for the conversation.
Then what is an acceptable off-ramp for Putin that the West and the US can give?
I really wish I knew. Most people who analyze this war don’t see the conditions for any kind of settlement being in place right now. As I read the Kremlin’s most recent statements about talks and terms, they sound like they’re saying, “We’re going to get stronger in the future. If you feel like these conditions are unacceptable, the ones in the future are going to be even worse, so you’d better take these.” And yet, we in the West still think that giving sufficient arms and sufficient support to Ukraine could put us in a position to get better terms, that Russia is actually under considerable stress. I’m not sure which of those is true.
What should the US red lines be when it comes to this war? And what happens if Russia doesn’t respect them?
The obvious red line is an unambiguous attack on a NATO country, which the US has committed to respond to. This has been made clear by the highest level of the Biden Administration.
What about hitting Russian targets inside Russia?
My understanding of American thinking on this is that we’re worried about a process of escalation that gets out of control. Let’s say Ukraine starts hitting targets wider throughout Russia using American weapons. And then the Russians respond in some way, like the sabotage campaign we’ve been observing in Europe. They’re going to start to escalate in some other subtle way to try to hit. And then suddenly we feel compelled to respond.
I personally am sympathetic to Biden’s slow approach, slowly increasing what Ukraine can do and being worried about the spiral. But I completely respect the view that says this is crazy, this is too conservative. The Biden administration has made perfectly clear the American interest does not involve a direct fight with Russia for Ukraine. So if you accept those premises, I view the way the Biden administration has managed escalation to be understandable, reasonable, and defendible.
If not NATO, is there an alternative solution that would see Ukraine equally secure from Russian aggression. What would you offer if Ukraine were to abandon its hopes of joining NATO?
I just said the American official position, which is unlikely to change, is that it is not prepared to fight Russia over Ukraine. That’s what NATO membership means. So talking about Ukraine’s NATO membership is a diversion from the real policy. And the real policy that could help to answer your question is the one Jens Stoltenberg suggested, which is what we needed to deliver in Washington – a long-term, credible commitment to continue aiding Ukraine so that Putin knows, “hey, the West is in this for the long haul.” Sadly, we don’t have a political consensus for that long-term commitment, and we have to keep fighting the battle to get Ukraine aid every single six months or every single year. That is the worst possible outcome. What Ukraine really needs is a consistent, credible, long-term program of assistance. I don’t agree with J.D. Vance that we can’t afford it. I think we can, and it’s in our interest. If Putin knew that for the next 10 years, if they’re still fighting, that we’re in there, he would change his assessment about negotiating terms in this war.
The reason Ukraine wanted to become a NATO member is to be secure and protected in the future. So what future do you see when it comes to NATO and Ukraine?
You don’t make a country secure by simply declaring that it’s a member of NATO. To be honest, the US States and NATO accepted the Baltic States before it had any credible way of defending them. It still doesn’t, in a way, but it has other things it can do to Russia in response to a potential Russian incursion into those countries. So adding a country the size of France with a massive border with Russia to an alliance when you don’t have the political will, when you don’t have the capacity to defend it, is crazy. But there might be other guarantees that could be offered to Ukraine as part of a settlement of the war, and may they look a lot like NATO membership. We could create a situation where Ukraine could be defended by the US and its allies in Europe, but not right now. I don’t want to rule out the possibility that someday in the future it could be possible, but there are lots of different ways of providing security to countries that don’t necessarily involve Article V commitments.
What do you think is at stake in the Ukraine war for the West?
Unless the world sees that Russia has paid a very large price, or pays a very large price for territorial aggrandizement, the norm against territorial conquest will weaken and we leave the US States and its allies less secure and less prosperous. If it was so costly to Russia, that other countries, other leaders, other potential revisionists look at it and say, that is not a path I want to go down, see that it was a disaster for Putin, they would think twice. I really do believe we can do it without sparking a major war. Having the nation of Ukraine go down in history for Russians as a failure would be a good thing for global and US security.
Interview by Vazha Tavberidze
